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Executive summary 
The linkage between religion and armed conflict has been hotly debated over recent years.1 Much 
previous research has been concerned with questions about the conditions under which religion may 
be a cause of violent conflict. At present, much of the literature and the general debate concentrate 
on religious extremism.2 The literature ignores the complex role of religion, particularly in multi-
religious countries. Our point of departure in the present study is Islam’s role in peacebuilding, 
focusing on the period after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 
2005. We regard peacebuilding as strategies to develop trust and build confidence among 
communities in order to build political institutions for democratic rule and the promotion of human 
rights.3 An important aspect of religious peacebuilding is the debate and discourse dedicated to 
clarifying religious attitudes towards human rights. The most intense debates are currently being 
conducted within the religious traditions as they continuously interact with secular actors, with 
other religions and with their own diverse and ideologically plural membership. Muslims’ internal 
struggle regarding human rights is probably the most consequential debate unfolding at present. Our 
focus of analysis is whether the religiously defined rights of non-Muslims and women are in 
alignment or in conflict with international human rights. Whether the religiously defined rights of 
non-Muslims and women are in alignment or in conflict with international human rights depends on 
who interprets the religious texts. To interpret religious laws is an elastic and selective exercise 
which varies from excluding to including historically marginalised groups such as non-Muslims and 
women as equal citizens in the Sudanese state.  
 
Government policy since independence has by and large disregarded Sudan’s multi-religious 
character through continuous Islamisation and Arabisation processes that have fuelled the civil war. 
International considerations regarding religious pluralism and the accommodation of different 
religious communities were at the forefront in the peace negotiations. The study outlines Islamic 
actors’ perception of non-Muslims’ rights after the peace agreement, including the rights of 
apostates. Also, the study elaborates how non-Muslims themselves perceive their rights within the 
frame of Islam.  
 
                                                     
1 See for example Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign 
Affairs, 1993); E.A. Henderson, “Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarities of States and the Onset of War, 
1820-1989” (Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (5), 1997); L. Reychler, “Religion and Conflict” (The International Journal 
of Peace Studies 2 (1), 1997); Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: 
The Free Press, 2002); Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: The Norton Series in World Politics, 2001); M. Reynal-Querol, “Ethnicity, 
Political Systems and Civil War” (Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1), 2002). 
2 See for example Y. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Pinter Press, 1997); W. Reich, Origins of Terrorism: 
Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); M. 
Kramer, The Islamism Debate (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997); M. 
Pinto, Political Islam and the United States: A Study of the U.S. Policy Toward Islamist Movements in the Middle East 
(Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999); Gilles Kepel, Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam (London: Tauris, 2004); Samuel 
Huntington, Clash of Civilizations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, 1993); E.A. Henderson, 
“Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarities of States and the Onset of War, 1820-1989” (Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 41 (5), 1997); L. Reychler, Religion and Conflict (The International Journal of Peace Studies 2 (1), 1997); 
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: The Free Press, 2002); Bruce 
Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace : Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New 
York: The Norton Series in World Politics, 2001); M. Reynal-Querol, “Ethnicity, Political Systems and Civil War” 
(Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1), 2002). 
3 Gunnar Sørbø, Peacebuilding in Post-War Situations: Lessons for Sudan (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, CMI Report 
R2004: 13). 
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In their eagerness to include marginalised religious groups, Sudanese and international 
peacebuilders ignored gender issues during the negotiations. In the name of religious freedom, the 
CPA and the national interim constitution have left the civil rights of women to the country’s 
religious communities – Islamic, Christian, and traditional African beliefs. Muslim and non-Muslim 
leaders alike perceive this as an intrinsic religious right. Civil rights such as marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, maintenance and financial custody of children, and alimony are perhaps the most 
tangible and important in the daily lives of “ordinary” Sudanese women. Yet, the CPA and the 
national interim constitution have not defined how the religious and tribal family laws that regulate 
women’s civil rights are being and should be formed and applied in today’s Sudan. Sudanese 
woman are granted different civil rights depending on which religious or tribal community they 
belong to. This study outlines the main discriminatory features in what has become a complicated 
patchwork of plural legalities for Sudanese women since the peace agreement.  
 
Religiously defined laws in and by themselves are not necessarily discriminatory against women, 
but this plural legal system does not guarantee all Sudanese women equal civil rights as enforced in 
today’s Sudan. The study shows that there are ongoing debates within the religious communities 
towards maintaining or changing the discriminatory features of religious and tribal family laws. 
Despite the fact that most Sudanese elite women deem their current “rights status” as 
discriminatory, they do not demand a secular law on women’s civil rights. They promote “changing 
from within” by reinterpreting and transforming the religious and tribal laws in a more gender equal 
direction. 
Major Findings 
The Rights of Non-Muslims 
In Sudan, most Muslim leaders we spoke to agree that non-Muslims should be granted full 
citizenship with all political rights, such as the right to run for public office, including the 
presidency. When they deem the rights granted non-Muslims in the CPA and the interim national 
constitution as in alignment with the sharia, they refer to the Islamic term dhimmi. Dhimmi is 
related to the treatment of non-Muslims under the Ottoman millet system where Christian and 
Jewish groups who belong to the “People of the Book” were regarded as “protected people”.  
 
Muslim leaders in power and in opposition do not agree on whether adherents to traditional African 
beliefs and apostates should be included in the category non-Muslims or as dhimmi. African 
traditional beliefs have historically been marginalised and excluded in Sudan. The CPA and the 
national interim constitution grant non-Muslims, including adherents to traditional African beliefs, 
full citizenship rights. This contrasts with the Islamist constitution of 1998, which does not regard 
traditional African beliefs as equivalent with religion, at least not explicitly. In contrast with the 
restrictive interpretation of dhimmi stipulated by the Islamist constitution of 1998, there are now 
Islamic interpretations of non-Muslims’ rights which represent an inclusive interpretation. This 
shows that whether non-Muslims’ rights in Islam are in alignment with international human rights 
depends on who interprets the sharia. 
 
Although adherents to traditional African beliefs are regarded as dhimmi in the CPA and the interim 
national constitution, the question of the rights of apostates is not explicitly dealt with. The Criminal 
Act 1991 prohibits apostasy from Islam and the punishment for this offence is execution. The law 
has still not been revised since the peace agreement.  
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The view of non-Muslims of their minority rights in Islam is that of exclusion and violence, 
according to many of those interviewed for this study. This must be understood in light of the long-
lasting civil war, in which Islam has been a tool of oppression in Sudan. They do not believe that 
the rights awarded to them in the CPA and the national interim constitution will be implemented as 
long as the state mixes Islam and politics. Islam is alien to the Sudanese mentality, say Christian 
leaders in Khartoum. The regime is a fundamentalist regime which propagates a type of Islam that 
leaves no room for religious freedom, they claim. Most of the grievances articulated by Christian 
church leaders concerning religious freedom under an Islamist regime are related to alcohol 
prohibition, the building of churches, and Christianity in the media and education.  
The Rights of Women 
In the name of religious freedom, the CPA and the national interim constitution have left the civil 
rights of women to the country’s religious communities – Islamic, Christian, and traditional African 
beliefs. This practice might also be traced back to the millet system established under the Ottoman 
Empire. The Ottoman term specifically refers to the separate legal courts pertaining to family law 
under which minorities were allowed to rule themselves. The civil rights and obligations are 
perhaps the most tangible and important in the daily lives of “ordinary” Sudanese women. Yet, the 
CPA and the national interim constitution have not defined how the religious and tribal family laws 
that regulate women’s civil rights are being and should be formed and applied in today’s Sudan. 
 
Concerning women’s (civil) rights, the focus of Norway and the international community in general 
is on Islam. Consequently, they overlook discriminatory practices within other religious and tribal 
communities. This is problematic, because in certain areas Islamic family law in Sudan might 
actually be considered less discriminatory than in other religious and tribal communities. For 
example, compared with the sharia it is in general more difficult for Christian women to obtain 
divorce. Equally, in customary law (based on traditional African beliefs and customs) it is virtually 
impossible for a woman to obtain a divorce. Whereas women have the right to get half the 
inheritance of a man in sharia, women do not have any right to inheritance at all in customary law. 
According to southern activists interviewed in this study, customary law is in conflict with 
international human rights.  
 
Despite the fact that most Sudanese elite women deem their current “rights status” to be 
discriminatory, they do not demand a secular law on women’s civil rights. They promote changing 
and expanding their rights from within. However, they actively use international conventions such 
as CEDAW to advocate for gender equality. Sudan is, together with the US, Iran, Somalia, Qatar, 
Nauru, Palau and Tonga, one of very few states yet to ratify CEDAW. Southern Sudanese elite 
women advocate ratifying CEDAW without reservations. In their opinion, the main reason why 
Sudan has not yet ratified the convention is because of Islam. They are partly correct in that the 
conservative perception of women’s civil rights within Islam as propagated by the regime is not in 
harmony with CEDAW. But the debate on CEDAW in the opposition shows that religiously defined 
laws are not in and by themselves discriminatory against women. When the sharia is interpreted in a 
liberal manner, women have rights. Muslim feminist activists in opposition therefore demand a total 
reform of the current codified Islamic family law. Muslim actors in opposition are able to draw 
upon and redefine the religious tradition’s ethical warrants for resistance against what they perceive 
to be the conservative and “un-Islamic” interpretation of women’s civil rights that is propagated by 
the current regime. 
 
The battle to “change from within” is different for Muslim and non-Muslim women. Since 
customary law is not a written codified law, there is little if any room for a flexible reinterpretation 
of the legal text that could increase women’s rights within the current system. It is thus not possible 
for southern Sudanese women to change the legal system from within by reinterpreting the sources 
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of the law itself, as seen in the contemporary reinterpretations of Islamic law. Furthermore, there 
exists no codification of the customary law, and consequently southern women do not have any 
state authority with which to negotiate new rights. Many interviewees in the study refer to the late 
leader of SPLM, John Garang, who in the wake of the peace agreement said that southern women 
were the most marginalised of all the marginalised groups in Sudan. So for southern women 
CEDAW becomes even more important, because if it were ratified the state would for the first time 
be forced to take responsibility for their civil rights. However, southern elite women warn the 
international community by saying that it takes more than a law reform to deal with discriminatory 
laws, because women at the grass roots are reluctant to change as they are socialised within the 
patriarchal habits, attitudes and value systems in place.  
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1. Introduction: Religion and Peacebuilding 
In the book Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation, the problematic role of religion in conflict is 
summarised in the following way: “Many people appeal to the will of God to justify what they do or 
do not do. As the classical question in the discussion regarding the relation between religion and 
ethics has it: Is that which is good what the gods will or is the will of the gods that which is good? 
Must we do what God says because God says it, or does God will it because it is good? What is the 
highest norm: God or that which is good?”4  
 
Religion is in the general literature often regarded as a basis for conflict, especially in the aftermath 
of “9/11” and of major conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Research has been preoccupied with 
the question under what conditions religion can be a cause of armed conflict and violence. Much of 
the literature, alongside popular perceptions, concentrates on religious extremism, particularly when 
it comes to Islam and the geographical area of the Middle East and North Africa. Although 
international attention has generally been paid to the linkage between religion and armed conflict, 
the linkage has been solidly debated the last years. An increasing number of scholars are devoting 
their attention to Religion and Peacebuilding,5 Faith-Based Diplomacy,6 Religions in Dialogue,7 
Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation,8 Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding9 and 
Religion, Politics and Peace.10 These academic writings describe religion as a key factor in 
peacebuilding, because religious actors have some distinctive features which make them significant 
peacebuilders: they possess structures and networks which are essential for mobilising the masses.11 
Moreover, the literature emphasises that religious actors can play a positive role in a post-conflict 
context, particularly in the reconciliation process, due to the power and strength of their spiritual 
guidance.12 Religious peacebuilding thus describes the range of activities performed by religious 
actors and institutions with the goal of building confidence among religious communities and 
political institutions characterised by an ethos of tolerance, non-violence and human 
rights. However, the body of literature seems to suggest that religious actors should be considered 
with some caution. Religious peacebuilding “is far from being a monolithic exercise”.13 Appleby 
emphasises that “too many religious leaders continue to pursue narrow sectarian or ethnic agendas 
and to think only of the needs and rights of their own people”.14 
 
In developing strategies for opposing social and political injustice non-violently, religious actors are 
able to draw upon and redefine their religious traditions’ ethical warrants for resistance against 
unjust conditions. Religious peacebuilding includes not only conflict resolution on the ground, but 
also the efforts of people working at a distance from actual sites of violent conflict, such as 
                                                     
4 Jerald D. Gort, Henry Jansen, and Hendrik M. Vroom, Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2002), p. 4.  
5 Harold Coward and Gordon Smith, Religion and Peacebuilding (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004). 
6 D. Johnston, Faith-Based Diplomacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
7 Alan Race and Ingrid Shafer, Religions in Dialogue; From Theocracy to Democracy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). 
8 Jerald D. Gort, Henry Jansen, and Hendrik M. Vroom, Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2002). 
9 S. Appleby, “Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding”, in D. 
Johnston and S. Sampson, Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
10 Leroy Rouner, Religion, Politics and Peace (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999). 
11 Ulrich Mans and Osman Mohammed Osman Ali, Stuck in Change; Faith-Based Peacebuilding in Sudan’s Transition 
(Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ October 2006)   
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 S. Appleby, “Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding”, in D. 
Johnston and S. Sampson, Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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advocates of religious human rights, scholars conducting research, inter-religious dialogue projects, 
and theologians and religious leaders.15 An important aspect of religious peacebuilding is the debate 
and discourse dedicated to clarifying religious attitudes toward human rights, in particular the extent 
and kind of religious human rights deserving protection in pluralist societies. Who participates in 
the rights-defining process? Whose criteria govern the interpretation and practice of human rights? 
The most intense, conflictual and perhaps the most consequential debates are currently being 
conducted within the religious traditions themselves as they continuously interact with secular 
actors, with other religions and with their own diverse and ideologically plural membership.16 
Muslims’ internal struggle regarding human rights is probably the most consequential debate 
unfolding at present. Many Muslims are increasingly engaged in thinking and activities that 
contribute to or are relevant to human rights. Human rights discourses within Islamic contexts are 
gaining attention, to the point that formal declarations have been issued by Muslim bodies. As such, 
there are constant encounters between Western and Islamic perceptions of rights. International 
conventions such as CEDAW, engineered by Westerners, individualise legal rights, thereby setting 
up the individual rights paradigm against the collective rights paradigm. The West’s monopoly and 
secular understanding of the human rights concept are effectively being questioned. This shows 
inter-legality between Islamic and Western legal thought, thus that they are in fact intertwined with 
each other, constituting each other dialectically, rather than being the autonomous or semi-
autonomous legalities we sometimes see them as being.17 Islam is a discursive religion undertaking 
continual change and thus transforms the sharia in encounters with other legal norms. The debate on 
whether Islam conforms to human rights is therefore important and also challenges our perceptions 
of human rights.18 
 
In December 2005 the Oslo Coalition for Freedom of Religion and Belief, together with Norwegian 
Church Aid, organised an inter-religious workshop in Sudan with participants from both the 
Christian and Muslim communities. Muslim leaders from grass-roots organisations as well as from 
political parties participated together with Christian bishops and other prominent church leaders. 
The political opposition leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, and his Ansar organisation played an active role in 
the discussion, whereas the person invited as the Sudanese government’s representative, al-Tayyib 
Zain Abidin, decided not to partake in the workshop.19 During this workshop the concept “Islam as 
a comprehensive way of life” was debated and identified as an obstacle to the rights of non-
Muslims in the country. However, the workshop interestingly showed us that the perceptions and 
views of the content and consequences of the concept “Islam as a comprehensive way of life” were 
both diverse and vague among the Muslim participants. The shifting perceptions of “Islam as a 
comprehensive system”, more specifically the rights of non-Muslims and women, is therefore the 
focus of this study.  
                                                     
15 Harold Coward and Gordon S. Smith (eds), Religion and Peacebuilding (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2004). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Argument put forward in Liv Tønnessen, “Gendered Citizenship in Sudan: Competing Perceptions of Women’s Civil 
Rights within the Family Laws among Northern and Southern Elites in Khartoum”, CMI woking paper (2007:4) presented 
at the workshop Plural Legalities in June 2007, Bergen. [The article is submitted to the Journal of Middle East Women’s 
Studies for publication]. 
18 S. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (Landham, MD: Rowman 
&Littlefield, 2000). 
19 In our interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin, the General Secretary of SIRC, on 11 February 2007 in Khartoum, he was 
outspokenly critical of the government, saying explicitly that the government is not Islamic, that it is corrupt, and that it 
does not follow up on the Islamic moral code. It is a military regime, he said, and all ministers are appointed not elected. 
We therefore question the claim made by Norwegian Church Aid and the Oslo coalition in their report to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that Abidin is in fact a governmental representative. 
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1.1 Religion and Conflict in Sudan 
When Sudan achieved independence on 1 January 1956, civil war had already erupted and, apart 
from a period of ten years from 1973 to 1983, relations were not restored to peace until the CPA 
between the NCP and the SPLM in 2005. Although the conflict may be presented as social, cultural, 
economic and political, religious convictions have played a role in justifying conflict as a religious 
demand or duty.20 The assumption among the Sudanese political Muslim elite was that this pursuit 
of Islamization and Arabization was “a natural process, and that it rolls by historical necessity from 
the “centers” […] toward the “peripheries”[…] It follows that it is only a matter of time before the 
whole country is Arabized and Islamized”.21 Sadiq al-Mahdi, who became prime minister in 1966, 
summarised Sudan’s future by declaring that “Islam has a holy mission in Southern Sudan”. In a 
speech to the National Assembly, he proclaimed that “the dominant feature of our nation is an 
Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this nation will not have its entity 
identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival”.22 The Islamisation 
policies have generated antagonism among the southern population. Religion has thus functioned as 
one important identity “marker”, creating a sense of common history and a sense of belonging to a 
distinct group. Religion has consequently been a part of the conflict mobilisation process 
throughout the civil war. Religious symbols and language have been used in order to demonise the 
other side, or to create a sense of righteousness for their own cause. The civil war in Sudan has at 
times been portrayed as a jihad whereby “themes of jihad and martyrdom have become an essential 
feature of the official discourse, particularly in mass media organs. Images from the “glorious” 
Islamic past have become regularly invoked to give the civil war, which the government insists has 
nothing to do with religion, an air of “divinity””.23 This means neither that all religious actors have 
lent their support to the civil war in Sudan, nor that religion is inherently conflictual and violent. 
However, religion in Sudan “has become a symbol of everything that identifies the parties and 
determines their relative position in the power hierarchy […]”.24 The basic political philosophy of 
“the northern elites towards the south entail the exclusion of southern Sudan from sharing 
power”.25  
 
There is a close link between religious identity and political identity, particularly in the North of 
Sudan.26 This can be traced back to the colonial period when the British recognised Sudanese 
involvement in government through the creation of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, 
The Council was a body of northern Sudanese elites, comprising representatives mainly from the 
two largest Islamic organisations in Sudan, the Ansar and the Khatmiyya. These still form the basis 
of the two largest political parties in northern Sudan: the Ummah Party led by Sadiq al-Mahdi and 
the DUP lead by Sayyid al-Mirghandi. No parliamentary regime in Sudan has been formed without 
the presence of at least one of the two political parties; “for the twenty-five first years of the 
country’s independence, political life in Sudan was dominated by the influence of personalities and 
organisations, parliamentary as well as military regimes, with the background division between the 
Khatmiyya and the Ansar”.27 The political system and “the mechanisms of participation were 
                                                     
20 Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 233. 
21 Leif Manger, in Gunnar Sørbø and Siegfried Pausewang (eds), Prospects for Peace, Security and Human Rights in 
Africa’s Horn (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2004), p. 128.  
22 Quoted in Girma Kebbede, Sudan’s Predicament: Civil War, Displacement and Ecological Degradation (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1999), p. 14. 
23 Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 223. 
24 Francis M. Deng and Abdullah Na’im, “Self-Determination and Unity; the Case of Sudan”, (Law & Policy 18 nr.3/4, 
1996), p. 215. 
25 Ibid., p. 93.  
26 John O. Voll, Sudan: State and Society in Crisis (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991).  
27 Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 
105-106. 
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defined in the framework of a basically Muslim society and Islamic themes”.28 Although the system 
was secular on the surface and willingly adopted a secular Western model of democracy, Islam did 
play a role in politics.29 The content of politics was not entirely secular, as the UP and the DUP 
knew that they owed their positions of power to the sectarian influences in Ansar and Khatmiyya.30  
 
The political parties’ and movements’ explicit demands and programmes have therefore been 
related to religious issues along a secular-religious continuum. The question of whether and how 
religion should be incorporated into the state has been hotly debated throughout the history of 
Sudan. Some of the political parties have explicitly raised demands related to the establishment of 
religious laws and legislation. However, it was under the authoritarian rule of Numayri that the 
sharia (Islamic law) was implemented in September 1983.31 The introduction of the sharia as the 
sole source of all law in September 1983 involved the full application of the hudud (the canonical 
penalties of the sharia) and the transformation of all other laws in accordance with the sharia. 
Although many aspects of family law had been dealt with according to the sharia in most parts of 
northern Sudan since independence, the sharia, as a comprehensive socio-legal system, had never 
been enforced in its entirety.32 Since the introduction of the sharia in Sudan, the SPLM has 
advocated its abolition.33 A repeal of Islamic law was a prerequisite of the movement for any 
reconciliation with the Sudanese government.34 The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement called 
for a new and democratic government with federal-style regionalism within a democratic and 
secular context.35  
1.2 Methodology 
This qualitative study is primarily based on semi-structured elite interviews, conducted in 
Khartoum, Sudan from 8 February to 8 March 2007, with Muslim opposition leaders, Christian 
church leaders, members of non-governmental and governmental organisations and government 
officials.36 We also had formal and informal conversations and discussions with local and 
international journalists, imams, AU soldiers, staff and students at the Afhad University for Women, 
Nileen University, the University of Khartoum, the International University of Africa, the Sudanese 
Studies Centre, representatives from UNMIS and other international non-governmental 
organisations in Sudan. Additionally, we visited local sharia courts and local traditional courts for 
customary law. We also attended informal discussion groups, among others with Turabi’s female 
followers, at which the vice-president of parliament during the reign of Turabi Khadija Karar was 
also present (see Appendix 2).  
 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, we monitored the local newspapers, and collected and 
analysed books, papers, pamphlets and booklets written by the opposition as well as government 
officials. 
 
                                                     
28 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 
81-82. 
29 Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996).  
30 Ibid. 
31 Aaron Layish and Gabriel Warburg, The Reinstatement of Islamic Law in Sudan under Numayri (Leiden, Boston, Köln: 
Brill, 2002). 
32 Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan (London: Frank Cass, 1987).  
33 John Garang (edited by Mansour Khalid), The Call for Democracy in Sudan (London : Kegan Paul International, 
1992).  
34 David Long and Bernard Reich, The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, (Boulder, San 
Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995). 
35 John Garang (edited by Mansour Khalid), The Call for Democracy in Sudan (London: Kegan Paul International, 1992). 
36 We have chosen to set interview citations for the fieldworks in November 2006 and February/March 2007 in the present 
tense. Prior interview citations are put in the past tense.  
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The study also builds on research conducted during prior visits to and fieldwork in Sudan. Roald 
visited Sudan three times in the late 1990s. In 2005 she participated in a Muslim-Christian dialogue 
workshop organised by the Oslo Coalition for Freedom of Religion and Belief and Norwegian 
Church Aid. During the three visits in 1990s, she visited various women organisations and 
conducted interviews with leading Islamists. Roald has published extensively on women and 
Islam.37  
 
Tønnessen conducted fieldwork in Khartoum, Sudan from 6 to 20 November 2006 during which she 
carried out 11 formal and a number of informal interviews with parliamentarians, academic 
researchers and activists within governmental and non-governmental organisations from both 
northern and southern Sudan. She also participated in a Training for Political Leadership workshop 
organised by the UNDP at Afhad University for Women for women lawyers (around 15-25 
participants) on 8 November, where she was able to listen in and to question the participants. She 
additionally attended a workshop organised by the Initiative for Inclusive Security during the course 
of 3 days (around 40 participants) from 9 to 12 November and spoke to and conducted short 
interviews with the participants. Tønnessen has previously carried out research on Hassan al-Turabi 
and his conception of democracy and the rights of women and non-Muslims within an Islamic 
state.38 
 
                                                     
37 See Anne Sofie Roald, Women in Islam: The Western Experience, (Routledge: London, 2001); “The Wise Men: 
Democratisation and Gender Equalization in the Islamic Message: Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Ahmad al-Kubaisi on the air” 
in Encounters 7:1 (Markfield: Islamic Foundation, 2001); Er muslimske kvinner undertrykt? (Oslo: PAX, 2005). 
38 See Liv Tønnessen, Islamism and Democracy: An Inquiry into the Political Thought of Hassan al-Turabi (Cand. Polit. 
thesis, University of Bergen 2005, 160 pages); “Hassan al-Turabi: maktsyk agitator eller kvinnevennlig demokrat” (article 
in Morgenbladet, September 8th-14th, No. 36, 2006); “Hassan al-Turabi’s Search for Islamist Democracy”(CMI Working 
Paper No.12, 2006); “Mannen bak Darfur-Konflikten” (article in Ny Tid, No. 19, 2006); “Islam har skylden?” (article in 
Studvest, April 5th 2006); “Islam på godt og vondt” (article in Bergens Tidende, February 8th 2006); “Islamisme og 
demokrati hånd i hånd” (Babylon Vol.3, No. 2, 2005). 
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2. The Rights of Non-Muslims 
A Muslim northern politician now in opposition regards the CPA as “a good chance for Sudan to 
end the history of discriminating policies”. He further states that “these people [southerners] have 
every right, because we have tortured them, killed them and enslaved them for centuries. Whatever 
the CPA gives them it is their right; the right to equal shares, equal rights and equal citizenship”. 
He goes on to say that “the problem of Sudan is discrimination and racism” and that as such the 
CPA represents “the rights of the historically enslaved people. They [the elite] are slave traders”.39 
 
In Sudan, most Muslim leaders we spoke to agree that non-Muslims should be granted full 
citizenship rights with all political rights, such as the right to run for public office, including the 
presidency. When they deem the rights granted non-Muslims in the CPA and the interim national 
constitution as “sharia”, they often refer to the Islamic term dhimmi. This term is related to the 
treatment of non-Muslims under the Ottoman millet system, in terms of which Christian and Jewish 
groups who belonged to the “People of the Book” were regarded as “protected people”. Muslim 
leaders in power and in opposition do not agree whether adherents to traditional African beliefs and 
apostates should be included in the category non-Muslims or designated dhimmi. Although 
adherents to traditional African beliefs are regarded as dhimmi in the CPA and the interim national 
constitution, the question of the rights of apostates is not explicitly dealt with. 
 
This lack of clarity shows that the group or term non-Muslim is not clearly defined. This impacts on 
the southerners’ perceptions of Islam as an inclusive religion. Many southerners we spoke to view 
Islam as an exclusive religion. Because of an institutionalised civil war in which Islam has been a 
tool of oppression in Sudan, they fear a state which mixes Islam and politics. Consequently, they do 
not believe that the rights given to them in the CPA and the national interim constitution will be de 
facto granted to them. Bishop Daniel Kur Adwok describes President Bashir as “not serious at all” 
about the CPA.40 Equally, Cardinal Gabriel Zubeir Wako, archbishop of Khartoum, claimed that the 
CPA “has been translated into agreements to peacefully continue war and prepare for war”.41 
2.1 Non-Muslims: Dhimmi or Citizens? 
When Muslim leaders42 deem the rights granted non-Muslims in the CPA and the interim national 
constitution as being in agreement with the sharia, they often refer to the Islamic term dhimmi. 
Dhimmi is related to the treatment of non-Muslims under the Ottoman millet system, where 
Christian and Jewish groups who belonged to the “People of the Book” (ahl al-kitab) were regarded 
as “protected people”. Milla (creed, religious community) is a Koranic word used to denote the 
belief system of Abraham.43 At the time of the Ottoman-Egyptian invasion of Sudan in 1820 the 
northern part of the country was Arabised and Islamised.44 Although the Ottoman-Egyptian rulers 
                                                     
39 Interview with an anonymous northern politician in opposition, on 4 March 2007 in Khartoum. 
40 Bishop Daniel Kur Adwok in the Khartoum Monitor on 12 February 2007 Vol. 6 No. 1138. 
41 Cardinal Gabriel Zubeir Wako, Archbishop of Khartoum, in the Khartoum Monitor on 12 February 2007 Vol.6 No. 
1138. 
42 The Muslim population in Sudan is almost entirely Sunni, but is divided into many different groups: Sufism, Ansar al-
Mahdi, Ansar al-Sunna and Islamism. According to the Encyclopaedia of the Orient there might be a small minority of 
Shi’a Muslims in Sudan. However, this possible minority is not mentioned in any statistics.  
43 See for instance the Koran 2: 130; 2: 135.  
44 In early Islamic history, Islam was gradually introduced into the north of Sudan by Arab miners and traders searching 
for gold and emeralds in the area between the Red Sea and Nile. In contrast to previous Egyptian rulers the Mameluke 
sultans took a missionary stance towards the Nubian Christians. P.M. Holt & M.W. Daly, A History of the Sudan, 
(Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2000), p. 22-37. 
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never controlled that part which today is known as southern Sudan, they claimed it belonged to the 
empire.  
 
The millet system under the Ottoman Empire granted religious minorities the right to deal with their 
internal affairs according to their own religious laws (see chapter 3, the Rights of Women).45 The 
religious minorities were granted freedom to practise their religion and to set up economic 
enterprises. The CPA and the interim national constitution must be viewed in light of this Islamic 
tradition. Ahmed Khalid, the leader of the Islamic council of jurisprudence, clearly states that “non-
Muslims’ rights are present in the sharia and that they have their religion within the sharia”.46  
 
The millet system under the Ottoman Empire did not initially grant the protected minorities political 
rights. The Muslim millet was regarded as the dominant one to which all other millets were 
subordinated.47 However, Christians did at certain times in history, particularly under the early 
Muslim empires, enjoy a relatively privileged status as administrative officials, scribes, 
philosophers and poets.48 In other historical periods, however, the situation of Christian 
communities (sing: ta’ifa, plural: tawa’if) was less secure, such as in the eras of the Fatimid (969-
1171) and the Mameluke (1250-1516) in Egypt.49 Coptic Christians started to move from Egypt to 
northern Sudan from the 7th century onwards and during the Ottoman-Egyptian reign (1820-1881). 
Middle Eastern Catholics also settled in northern Sudan, establishing small Christian minority 
churches in the overall Muslim area.50 In general, religious minorities in the Muslim world who 
belonged to the “People of the Book” enjoyed a certain tolerance for religious worship. It is our 
impression that the treatment of the Coptic and Catholic community has been good in Sudan. An 
anonymous Coptic trader says: “I came to Sudan from Egypt in 1969. The relationship between 
Muslims and Christians in Egypt is very tense. Outside the churches there have to be security 
guards because the Copts are a target for hatred and harassment. In Sudan, however, we, the 
Christians and the Muslims, live like brothers and sisters. The government even gave me Sudanese 
citizenship and I am proud to be a Sudanese. Sudan is the best country in the Middle East for 
Christians to live in”.51 
 
                                                     
45 Andrea Pacini (ed), Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East. The challenge of the future, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998). See particularly Bernard Botiveau, “National law and Non-Muslim Status” in Pacini, A. (ed) Christian 
Communities in the Arab Middle East. The challenge of the future, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), p. 111-126. 
46 Interview with Ahmed Khalid, the leader of the Islamic council of jurisprudence, on 25 February 2007 in Khartoum [the 
authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
47 Andrea Pacini (ed), Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East. The challenge of the future, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998), p. 6. 
48 Joseph Maila, “The Arab Christians: From the Eastern question to the recent political situation of the minorities”, in 
Pacini, A. (ed) Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East. The challenge of the future, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), p. 32. 
49 Joseph Maila, “The Arab Christians: From the Eastern question to the recent political situation of the minorities”, in 
Pacini, A. (ed), Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East. The challenge of the future, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), p. 32.  
50 The first record of Christianity in Sudan is from the 6th century, telling about preachers sent to the Nubians in the north 
of today’s Sudan. P.M. Holt & M.W. Daly, A History of the Sudan (Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2000), p. 2-3. Within 
the Christian minority in today’s northern Sudan, the Roman Catholic Church is the biggest congregation, followed by the 
Episcopal Church. Various Orthodox churches, such as the Coptic, the Ethiopian and the Greek-Orthodox, and Protestant 
churches such as the Presbyterian and the Pentecostal churches are also present. There are two main Christian umbrella 
organisations: the Sudan Council of Churches, founded in Khartoum in 1972, and the New Sudan Council of Churches, 
founded in Nairobi in 1989. The latter organisation operates mainly in the South of Sudan. With the fall of the Mahdi 
state, Britain and Egypt proclaimed a Condominium in 1899 and Christians of various denominations started to settle in 
the area. Although the British-Egyptian administration controlled the whole of today’s Sudan they treated northern and 
southern Sudan as separate entities. The division was reinforced by allowing Christian missionaries to work in southern 
Sudan, while simultaneously prohibiting Islamic missionaries in the area. 
51 Conversation with an anonymous Coptic cotton trader on 23 February 2007 in Shendi [the authors’ translation from 
Arabic].  
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There were, however, restrictions regarding the building of churches and synagogues, religious 
processions and the ringing of church bells. Moreover, minorities were restricted from expressing 
themselves in public. Generally, they were regarded as inferior to the Muslim majority socially and 
legally. As a result of the Ottoman reform programme (tanzimat) in 1839 and 1856, Christian and 
Jews acquired equal legal status to Muslims in the whole of the Ottoman Empire, and the above-
mentioned restrictions were to a certain extent abolished.52  
 
In Sudan, most Muslim leaders we spoke to agree that non-Muslims should be granted full 
citizenship rights. It remains unclear, however, whether they include adherents of traditional 
African beliefs and apostates in the non-Muslim category. African traditional religions are mainly 
practised in southern Sudan, but there are internally displaced people in the greater Khartoum area 
who adhere to indigenous beliefs. The various belief systems enjoy authority and have significant 
influence at the local level.53 This group has historically been marginalised in Sudan. 
2.2 The Status of Non-Muslims in the CPA and the National Interim 
Constitution 
The CPA and the national interim constitution grant non-Muslims full citizenship rights, including 
the provision that “eligibility for office, including the presidency, public service and the enjoyment 
of all rights and duties shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, beliefs or customs”. The 
non-Muslim group includes adherents of traditional African beliefs as citizens in the peace 
agreement and the national interim constitution. There is reference throughout to beliefs alongside 
religion: “For avoidance of doubt, no one shall be subject to discrimination by the National 
government, state, institutions, group of persons or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs”. 
 
In the CPA and the interim national constitution, then, dhimmi has been widened to include 
adherents of religions and beliefs other than the “People of the Book”. Ahmed Khalid, the leader of 
the Islamic council of jurisprudence, clearly states that the CPA and the interim national 
constitution were approved by the council. This means that these documents are considered in 
alignment with the sharia. 
 
When we posed the question of rights for non-Muslims in Sudan, some Muslims criticised the 
interim national constitution of 2005, because in their view it does not provide equal protection of 
Muslims in southern Sudan as it does for non-Muslims in northern Sudan.54 “The Muslim minority 
in the south does not have the same rights as the non-Muslims in the north”, says Attiyah 
Mustapha, who is a Member of Parliament for the NCP.55 Muslims in southern Sudan need 
protection, according the leader of the Sudan Inter-Religious Council (SIRC), which is an 
organisation consisting of Muslims and Christians. The Secretary General is at present a Muslim, 
al-Tayyib Zain Abidin, and the Vice Secretary General is a Christian. Aberdin states: “There are 
several cases of violence against Muslims in the South. One example is a decree preventing women 
from wearing a scarf. This is prejudice. They have so many problems in the South; why care about 
                                                     
52 In the 1876 constitution these reforms were repealed. However, as Bernard Botiveau has observed the reform texts 
“contained legitimizing principles which subsequently facilitated the task of the Kemalist revolution in the 1920s”. See 
Botiveau, Bernard, “National Law and Non-Muslim Status”, in Pacini, A. (ed), Christian Communities in the Arab Middle 
East. The challenge of the future, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p 6, 112.  
53 “Sudan: Religions, Peoples, Languages”. Found at: http://lexicorient.com/e.o/sudan_4.htm; see also Benjamin C. Ray, 
African Religions. Symbol, Ritual, and Community (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976).  
54 Interview with Attiyah Mustapha, Member of Parliament for the National Congress Party, on 17 February 2007 in 
Khartoum.  
55 Ibid. 
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young girls wearing scarves? Another example is that the Zakat [charity] institution in the South 
has been closed down”.56  
 
According to Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the UP, “non-Muslims are not dhimmi in Sudan, 
because this is a historically governed principle for the treatment of conquered people. The non-
Muslims in Sudan are not conquered, they are co-citizens”.57 Sadiq al-Mahdi also includes 
adherents to traditional African beliefs when he speaks of non-Muslims in Sudan. He presented this 
view in the workshop organised by the Oslo Coalition in Khartoum in December 2005. He says: 
“we can say with Islamic authenticity that Islam, whose beliefs and teachings are well defined and 
specific, recognizes religious plurality, and even spiritual and moral worthiness in abrahamic 
religions […]. This tolerant attitude even extends to those who have sought truth without the benefit 
of a revelation”.58 This shows that whether non-Muslims’ rights within the sharia are in alignment 
with international human rights depends on who interprets the sharia. Sadiq al-Mahdi’s 
interpretation (ijtihad) of the sharia concerning the rights of non-Muslims shows that is a selective 
and elastic exercise that is continually changing in encounters with other legal norms. In his 
opinion, he does not see any incompatibility between his views and “the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and 
with the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief (1981). It will act as the Sudanese Commitment to Religious Coexistence”.59 
 
THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT 
ARTICLE 6 Religious Rights 
Recognizing that Sudan is a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country 
and confirming that religion shall not be used as a divisive factor, the Parties hereby agree as follows: 
6.1 Religions, customs and beliefs are a source of moral strength and inspiration for the Sudanese people. 
6.2 There shall be freedom of belief, worship and conscience for all the followers of all religions, beliefs and
customs and no one shall be discriminated against on such grounds. 
6.3 Eligibility for office, including the presidency, public service and the enjoyment of all rights and duties 
shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, beliefs or customs.  
6.4 All personal and family matters including marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession and affiliation may be
governed by the personal laws (including Sharia or other religious laws, customs and traditions) of those 
concerned. 
6.5 The Parities agree to respect the following Rights: 
6.5.1 To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief and to establish and maintain places for
these purposes; 
6.5.2 To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions; 
6.5.3 To make, acquire, use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or
custom of a religion or belief; 
6.5.4 To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas; 
6.5.5 To teach religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes; 
6.5.6 To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions; 
6.5.7 To train, appoint, elect and designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements 
and standards of any religion or belief; 
6.5.8 To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of
one’s religious belief; 
6.5.9 To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and
belief and at the national and international levels; 
6.5.10 For avoidance of doubt, no one shall be subject to discrimination by the National government, state,
institutions, group of persons or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs. 
                                                     
56 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin.  
57 Interview with Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the UP, on 3 March 2007 in Khartoum.  
58 Sadiq al-Mahdi, ”Religious Coexsistence in the Sudan” (paper presented at a workshop on Freedom of Religion and 
Belief organised by the Oslo Coalition on Religion and Belief in collaboration with Norwegian Church Aid, December 
2005, in Khartoum), p. 4.  
59 Ibid., p. 7. 
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A provision that Islam was the source of law was introduced into the constitutional bill in Sudan in 
1968 which was later enacted.60 Article 113 of the bill states that “Islamic sharia is the basic source 
of law in the state”.61 “Sharia as a source of law” is thus not something which the Islamist regime 
instituted with the coup d’état in 1989. It took nine years for the Islamists to construct a new 
constitution in 1998. Hassan al-Turabi was the major entrepreneur behind the constitution. In this 
Islamist constitution there is no requirement for the president to be a Muslim (Article 36), but it is 
not explicitly stated that non-Muslims can run for the presidency. Article 24 provides for freedom 
of religion under the heading “freedom of creed and worship”, stipulating that “every human being 
shall have the right of freedom of conscience and religious creed and he shall have the right to 
declare his religion or creed, and manifest the same by way of worship, education, practice or 
performance of rites or ceremonies; and no one shall be coerced to adopt such faith, as he does not 
believe in, nor to practise rites or services he does not voluntarily consent to; and that is without 
prejudice to the right of choice of religion, injury to the feelings of others, or to public order, all as 
may be regulated by law”.62 
 
In contrast to the CPA and the national interim constitution, the Islamist constitution of 1998 does 
not regard beliefs as equivalent with religion, at least not explicitly. It states that “all persons are 
equal before the law. Sudanese are equal in the rights and duties of public life without 
discrimination based on race, sex or religion (article 21)”, with no reference to traditional African 
beliefs. Turabi claims that that “equality should be observed without legal religious discrimination 
in capacity for election rights, qualification for office in public service, access to opportunities in 
general life and public treatment in personal relations”.63 Turabi announced in the media and in an 
interview with us that “a southerner should become president of Sudan”. However, Turabi was 
quick to point out in the interview that he was speaking about a special type of southerner, namely 
“a southerner who lives in the north”.64 He advocates that “laws that govern the personal and 
private scope of life can relate to the different individuals or parties concerned”. 65 Here there is 
clear reference to the millet system under the Ottoman Empire. He says that “we borrowed the idea 
from the constitution of Medina – the only written constitution of those days, some 1400 years ago – 
under the command of the Prophet. It was a federated state with tolerance of other religions, which 
also gave them freedom of education and worship. The dialogue between Jews and Muslims was 
free, although they were a small minority”.66 He goes on to state that “the family law is subject to 
the parties' own volition, just like contractual law, referable to sharia, a particular church canon, a 
customary southern religious norm or any other reference that binds non-Sudanese”. 67 It 
becomes clear that he does not regard southern adherents to traditional African beliefs as dhimmi as 
he refers to them as “non-Sudanese”. He thereby upholds the traditional perception of dhimmi as 
“the People of the Book”, that is Christians and Jews. This is problematic as the majority of the 
southerners are adherents of traditional African beliefs and thus not eligible for citizenship rights in 
the view of Turabi. There is a subtle racism underpinning Turabi’s views on adherents to traditional 
African beliefs, characterising them in an interview as “uncivilised” and saying that “some of them 
                                                     
60 Independent Sudan’s first constitution, which with small amendments has been in force and suspended back and forth 
several times in periods of parliamentary rule in 1956-1958, 1964-1969 and 1985-1989, was instituted by the British on 
the ideal of a secular state. 
61 “An Ideology of Domination and the Domination of an Ideology. Islamism, Politics, and the Constitution in the Sudan”. 
Found at: www.usip.org/religionpeace/rehr/sudanconf/abdelmoula.html  
62 Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 1998: Article 24. 
63 Hassan al-Turabi, ”Religious and Regional Issues” (unpublished paper, Khartoum, 2003), p. 4. 
64 Interview with Hassan al-Turabi, leader of PNC, on 20 February 2007 in Khartoum; interview with Addam Bashir 
Rahma, political advisor of Hassan al-Turabi, on 26 February 2007 in Khartoum. 
65 Hassan al-Turabi, ”Religious and Regional Issues” (unpublished paper, Khartoum, 2003), p. 4. 
66 Turabi, in Hamdi, Mohamed Elhachmi, The Politicisation of Islam; A Case Study of Tunisia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1998), p. 99. 
67 Hassan al-Turabi, ”Religious and Regional Issues” (unpublished paper, Khartoum, 2003), p. 4. 
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do not even wear clothes”.68 Turabi, then, has, in contrast to Sadiq al-Mahdi, a restrictive 
interpretation (ijtihad) of the sharia concerning the rights of non-Muslims where he excludes 
adherents of traditional African beliefs from citizenship.  
 
The CPA exempts non-Muslims from Islamic law: “Sharia is to remain applicable in the North and 
parts of the constitution are to be rewritten so that sharia does not apply to any non-Muslims 
throughout the Sudan […]. Nationally enacted legislation applicable to southern Sudan […] shall 
have as its sources of legislation popular consensus, the values and the customs of the people of the 
Sudan, including their traditions and religious beliefs, having regard to the Sudan’s diversity.”.69 
However, this does not represent something new. In the Islamist constitution non-Muslims are also 
exempted from the sharia. Non-Muslims have historically been exempted from sharia since the 
September laws of 1983 when it comes to the letter of the law. For example, during the regimes of 
both Numayri and the Islamists the punishment for drinking wine was applicable only to Muslims, 
although wine drinking coupled with offending the sensibility of another person or disturbance of 
public order was applicable to members of all religions. However, non-Muslims were subjected to 
the hudud penalties concerning murder and theft according to the Criminal Act of 1991. In the 
peace agreement and the interim national constitution, however, non-Muslims are exempted from 
the sharia altogether, including the hudud penalties.70  
 
According to the general secretary of the semi-governmental organisation SIRC Abidin, the peace 
agreement and the interim constitution have secured the protection of minorities. When asked 
specifically whether non-Muslims since the peace agreement have been subjected to the sharia, he 
explains: “Before, sharia applied to Christians in hudud [punishment] issues. But, even then, 
apostasy, for instance, did not apply to Christians, neither did wine drinking, nor fornication or 
qasf [bringing false witnesses to fornication]. The only sharia laws which applied to Christians 
were theft and murder. Murder is murder and actually, the Islamic law is better than the civil law 
as it is possible to avoid death sentence by providing blood money to the family of the victim. As for 
theft this was actually a problem for Christians as many Christians are displaced and they live in 
poor neighbourhoods. They would steal due to their poor condition and they were then convicted. 
Also, the case of Christian women selling wine was difficult. The selling of wine is not allowed. But 
now the Christians are not punished for these offences according to sharia.”71  
2.2.1 Apostasy 
Although adherents of traditional African beliefs are regarded as equally non-Muslim as “People of 
the Book” in the CPA and the interim national constitution, the question of the rights of apostates is 
not explicitly dealt with. 
 
Article 24 in the Islamist constitution of 1998 might give the impression that it is possible “not to 
believe” or not to profess belief in a religion as the text expresses the freedom of “conscience”. The 
general understanding of freedom of religion in Western countries, where the freedom of religion or 
conscience paragraph (Article 18)72 in the Declaration of Human Rights indicates freedom of as 
well as from religion, has no applicability in the Islamist constitution in Sudan. Although Article 18 
does not mention the possibility of or a prohibition against converting to another religion or leaving 
                                                     
68 Interview with Hassan al-Turabi. 
69 Interim Constitution of Sudan 2005: Article 5. 
70 Ahron Layish and Gabriel Warburg, The Reinstatement of Islamic Law in Sudan under Numayri; An Evaluation of a 
Legal Experiment in the Light of its Historical Context, Methodology and Repercussions (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 
71 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin. 
72 Article 18 says: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” 
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a religious tradition, the Criminal Act 1991 explicitly prohibits apostasy from Islam and the 
punishment for this offence is execution.73 In Sudan, converting from Islam is thus forbidden by 
law. It is important to be aware that this prohibition and its punishment contradict the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR [1966]), which was ratified by Sudan in 1986 and 
whose Article 18 explicitly states that “no one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or a belief of his choice”.74 This contrasts with Turabi’s 
philosophical interpretation (ijtihad) on the issue of apostasy: “ the death sentence on the apostate 
was not mandatory but conditional on his engaging in a war against the Muslim community”.75 He 
says that “it becomes an obvious religious principle that there should be no compulsion in 
religion”. According to Turabi, the Prophet’s statement on apostasy is brief and was made in direct 
connection with the state of war: “Muslims used to have misgivings about killing a former Muslim 
who joined enemy ranks. The Prophet said to them: you may kill anyone who has changed his faith 
and broken ranks with the Muslims. This statement was culled out of context and used to override 
the basic religious principle of freedom of religion and faith. How can a sensible person believe 
that God does not compel anyone to believe but allows us to force people to do so? [...] This makes 
me reject totally the conventional view regarding the rule of apostasy”.76 
 
On the issue of apostasy, the general secretary of the semi-governmental organisation SIRC Abidin 
states: “in the constitution [1998 and 2005] there is nothing about apostasy as it states religious 
freedom, and today apostasy is not an issue. If we raise the issue, a new problem will be created, as 
theoretically speaking there is a problem [due to the apostasy law in the Criminal Act]. Practically, 
however, apostasy is not a problem. No one has been punished according to this law. If it were to 
happen we would work against it”.77 
 
According to Abidin, the execution of the politician and scholar Mahmoud Muhammad Taha in 
1985 for blasphemy was not a religious act, but a political decision. Abidin explains: “Taha 
criticised Numayri’s religious laws and Numayri looked for a junior judge to take the case and get 
him executed. It was not at first about apostasy. Taha refused to appeal, so the court itself decided 
to appeal. This procedure in itself is rather uncommon. The appeal was brought to the special court 
created by Numayri for Islamic laws and they changed the charge to apostasy. But, in my view, it 
was not about apostasy, it was a political issue”.78 
 
When asked about atheists and their rights in Sudanese society, Abidin claims that there are no 
atheists in Sudan. “At least”, he says, “if there are any, they do not declare themselves to be 
atheists.79 Atheists would be afraid to declare to be atheists as this will create a bad image for 
them”. The general religious character of the Sudanese people, he believes, will make people shun 
atheists. “But”, he states, “there are no atheists in Sudan. Even the communists believe in God, as in 
the last election in Sudan the communist party’s political meetings would start with recitation of the 
Koran”. He refers to a letter he received from a leading communist in which the works of Ibn 
Arabi, the famous Medieval Sufi sheikh, are quoted. This stance was confirmed by Nugud, the 
leader of the SCP: “the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement wants a secular state in the Western 
sense whereas the communist party wants a secular state in a Sudanese sense. This means that 
                                                     
73 Sudan Department of Justice; Criminal Act Chapter 13: 126. 
74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): Article 18. 
75 Turabi, in Sidahmed Abdel Salam, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 
189. 
76 Turabi, in Hamdi, Mohamed Elhachmi, The Politicisation of Islam; A Case Study of Tunisia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1998), p. 88. 
77 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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Islam cannot be ignored when it comes to, for instance, education and the family law. As such, 
Islam cannot completely be taken out of the constitution. Sudanese society is an Islamic society”.80 
2.3 Non-Muslims’ View of their Rights in Islam 
The above discussion shows that there are various perceptions of the rights of non-Muslims among 
Muslim leaders in Sudan. And more importantly, it shows that the group or term non-Muslim is not 
clearly defined. This impacts on southerners’ perception of Islam as an inclusive religion. 
Southerners we spoke to ascribed Turabi’s perceptions to that of Islam, consequently saying that 
Islam is an exclusive religion.  
 
This is illustrated in Nihal Bol’s statement in the daily newspaper the Citizen: “Dr. Turabi, the 
party is over; domestic colonialism is nearing its end in Sudan. If you want to save your soul, stand 
up and confess your evils […]”.81 The General Secretary for the Catholic Secretariat in Khartoum, 
Peter Loro, regards the present understanding of Islam in Sudan as alien to the “Sudanese 
mentality”. He claims that the problem between the two groups are caused by what he calls “the 
fundamentalist regime”, which according to him has adopted “a type of Islam from outside Sudan 
and uses Islam to indoctrinate people that non-Muslims are kafirs [non-believers]”.82 The notion 
that Islamism is an understanding of Islam alien to the Sudanese mentality was also referred to by 
other Christian leaders and even Muslim representatives with whom we discussed the question. 
Many referred to the incident in December 2005 when police attacked the All Saints Cathedral in 
Khartoum: “The assault might be blamed on the unprofessionalism of the police, but it is at least an 
indication of the religious fanaticism, if not outright hostility towards southerners”. 
 
At a meeting, members of the Sudan organisation for non-violence and development (SONAD), an 
inter-religious dialogue group, presented their view of the situation. In their opinion the political 
elites in power and in opposition alike misuse religion and mobilise for political gains. The problem 
of Sudan is in their opinion “not a religious problem, but a political one”.83 When you mix religion 
in politics you end up with a situation of non-acceptance of alternative views, even within the same 
religion, the group stated. Their views indicate a lack of legitimacy on the part of the political elite 
at the grass roots. The political elite, with their discourse on Islam’s role in political affairs, is quite 
oblivious to whom they are representing. The participants in this meeting – Muslim and Christians, 
northerners and southerners – were quite clear in their belief that the elites were merely representing 
themselves. “Turabi is an evil man”, a member of SONAD said, because he continuous to misuse 
religion.84 This confirms Appleby’s concern about religion and peacebuilding that too many 
religious leaders continue to pursue narrow sectarian or ethnic agendas, thinking only of the needs 
and rights of their own people (see chapter 1, Introduction: Religion and Peacebuilding).85 
However, we also met a southern Christian woman who said about Turabi that “I like Turabi as a 
thinker, but not as a politician”, thereby recognising the difference between theory and practice 
when it comes to Islam and politics in Sudan.86  
 
                                                     
80 Interview with Mohammed Ibrahim Nugud, the leader of the SCP, on 5 March 2007 in Khartoum.  
81 Nhial Bol in the Citizen on12 February 2007 Vol 2 No 52.  
82 Interview with Peter Loro, General Secretary for the Catholic Secretariat in Khartoum, on 13 February 2007 in 
Khartoum. 
83 Conversation with Muslim and Christian participants at a meeting of the Sudan Organisation for Non-Violence and 
Development, SONAD, lead by Ilham Khayri on 16 February 2007 in Khartoum [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
84 Ibid. [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
85 S. Appleby, “Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding”, in D. 
Johnston and S. Sampson, Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
86 Interview with an anonymous southern woman (Shilluk) on 17 February 2007 in Khartoum.  
CMI REPORT DISCRIMINATION IN THE NAME OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM R 2007: 5 
 14 
There are Christian members of the northern political parties, including the NCP. Helen Louise 
Olear, a MP for NCP representing Eastern Equatorial State, said that “there is no segregation in the 
party. They do not force me to change my religion. There is no problem”. She states further that 
there are common values between Islam and Christianity like “Karama [generosity] and respect for 
family values”.87 
 
During our fieldwork the government established a Commission for the Protection of Non-Muslims 
in the National Capital. According to Abidin, who is also a member of the commission, it has been 
established in order to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims are protected and respected in 
accordance with the CPA and the national interim constitution, and particularly that non-Muslims 
are in fact exempted from the sharia law in Khartoum.88 Alfred Taban, the editor of the southern 
newspaper Khartoum Monitor, believes that although it is true in practice that non-Muslims are no 
longer subjected to the hudud law, theoretically it is still a problem. “The laws abide”, he claims, 
“and the only reason for the Sudanese authorities to delay the hudud punishments was the 
international reactions against them. The punishments might, though, be reapplied at any moment”.  
 
Taban initially welcomed the Commission, but after the names of the members of the Commission 
were announced he criticised the composition of the committee. He sees the Commission as “a 
great disservice to non-Muslims” and he calls for its dissolution.89 His main argument is that there 
are more Muslims than non-Muslims on the committee – 15 Muslims and 13 non-Muslims. He 
discusses the Muslim members and claims that they are “predominantly fundamentalists who would 
like to see Sudan become an Islamic state. Thus, he says, the so-called rights of non-Muslims which 
the Commission is supposed to protect are actually what the sharia law [already] permits”.90 Taban 
further sees the appointment of the commission as “a political ploy meant to reassure non-Muslims 
that they, in theory are most welcome in their own capital city. In practice, however, the non-
Muslims, who by definition do not believe in Islamic laws, must abide by the Islamic sharia law”.91 
Taban reinforced his statement that many of the Muslim members are staunch Islamists. “What is 
the point”, he exclaimed, “the committee is just a show-off”.92 Again, non-Muslims’ view of their 
rights in Islam is that of exclusion. Because of an institutionalised civil war in which Islam has been 
a tool of oppression, they fear a state which mixes Islam and politics. Consequently, they do not 
believe that the rights given to them in the CPA and the national interim constitution will be de 
facto granted to them. According to an anonymous Christian southern woman there is “not much 
difference after the CPA, still discrimination”.93According to Helen Olear, on the other hand, “the 
CPA takes care of everything, also the political rights of religious minorities and women”.94 
 
Most of the grievances uttered by the Christian church leaders we interviewed in Khartoum were 
related to alcohol prohibition, the building of churches, and Christianity in the media and 
education.95 There are mutual accusations from Christian and Muslim leaders on what rights they 
are actually granted. This indicates tension between the two groups at the elite level. 
                                                     
87 Interview with Helen Louise Olear, MP for the National Congress Party (NCP) for the southern Eastern Equatoria state 
on 14 February 2007 in Khartoum.  
88 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin 
89 The Khartoum Monitor on 17 February 2007, Vol 6 No. 1143, p. 2. 
90 Interview with Alfred Taban, the editor of the Khartoum Monitor, on 24 February 2007 in Khartoum.  
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Interview with an anonymous southern woman (Shilluk).  
94 Interview with Helen Louise Olear. 
95 Friday is a public holiday in Khartoum. Some Christians might have the day off on Sundays, but civil servants, teachers 
and students are obliged to work and study on Sundays. Some of the Christian informants complained that it is difficult for 
students (and pupils) to get time off to attend the sermon. Additionally, they claimed that exams would often fall on 
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Alcohol Prohibition 
A Christian southern Member of Parliament for the NCP, Helen Louise Olear, says that 
Christians are allowed to drink alcohol at private gatherings: “before the gathering the 
Christians have to inform the police and the drinking of alcohol will be accepted as it is the 
trading of alcohol which is forbidden”.96 Christians in opposition claim that although the 
alcohol prohibition concerns brewing, trade and transport only, the government still does 
not accept the use of alcohol for private purposes. The church leaders even state that they 
are not allowed to use wine for Holy Communion. So in order to perform Holy 
Communion, church leaders are forced to get hold of the wine illegally, according to the 
leader of the Sudan Council of Churches.97 As such, it seems as though Christians have to 
break the law in order to fulfil their ritual obligations towards their congregation. This was 
also a concern stated by various church leaders at the Muslim-Christian dialogue workshop 
in Khartoum in November 2005.  
  
Building of Churches 
One of the primary grievances uttered by Christians in Khartoum concerns permits to build new 
churches. In this area there have been improvements since the CPA. Due to the effort of SIRC, the 
Guidance and Endowment Ministry has decided to raise three new churches in Khartoum.98 Abidin 
is critical of the fact that Christians are not given free lots of land to build their churches, whereas 
Muslims get land for mosques. According to him, the government’s rationale for restricting the 
building of new churches in Khartoum is the “hope” that the southern Christian population, many 
whom are internally displaced, will in time return to southern Sudan: “The authorities therefore see 
no need to offer possibilities for authorised churches in Khartoum as most Christians will return to 
the South”. In contrast to many Christians we spoke to,99 he claims that the government does not 
impede the establishment of unauthorised prayer locals. “However”, he says, “many of the 
unauthorised prayer locals are situated in the areas of the displaced camps and these camps are 
often in unplanned areas. Khartoum is expanding and whenever the governmental urban planning 
office arrives at such an unplanned place in order to start building new houses, they will destroy all 
unauthorised buildings in the area”.  
 
But according to Alfred Taban, “there are many “unplanned” houses in Khartoum, but only the 
southerners’ neighbourhoods are demolished”. So in his opinion, there is no doubt that the 
southerners face discrimination. There is “no change after the peace agreement”. He says further 
that “Christians are suffering in general”.100  
 
Christianity in the Media and in Education 
In our discussion with Christians, they grieved about the lack of media access for Christians. Sister 
Margareth, a Sudanese Catholic nun with Syrian ancestors, is the vice chairperson of Christians and 
Muslims for Peace (CAMP), an organisation which came into being through a governmental 
intervention. She told us that on the national radio and television Christian issues would be aired 
merely one hour a week. “On Sundays”, she said, “there is a Christian sermon on the radio, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Middle Eastern countries Friday would be the public holiday. Similarly in Norway, Muslims do not get Fridays off and in 
some workplaces there are even obstacles to Muslims taking a couple of hours off on Fridays to attend the Friday prayer. 
96 Interview with Helen Louise Olear. 
97 Interview with Reverend Marc Akec, leader of the Sudan Council of Churches, on 26 February 2007 in Khartoum. This 
point was also confirmed by other church leaders, although they were all quite reluctant to discuss the matter of how they 
get hold of alcohol for ritual purposes. 
98 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin.  
99 Almost all church leaders we spoke to confirmed the difficulties in establishing new churches and prayer locals. 
100 Interview with Alfred Taban. 
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whereas the Islamic call for prayer (adhan) is aired both on radio and television five times daily”. 
Moreover, recitation of the Koran and religious Islamic programmes are very common in the media, 
she claimed. One of the Muslim members of the peace group SONAD states that this discrimination 
in media representation started as far back as 1983. In his opinion, it creates a feeling of superiority 
for the Muslims and conversely a feeling of oppression for the Christians.  
 
Sister Margareth further identifies the national Islamic educational curriculum as a problem for non-
Muslims, because it is compulsory for all pupils in order to pass a Sudanese exam: “the government 
wants to force upon us [the Christians] an Islamic education. In the curriculum everything deals 
with Islam: Islamic history, Islamic geography, and even Islamic maths. They want our children to 
learn the Koran by heart. What do the Muslims want? Do they give out their holy texts to dogs? We 
the Christians do not care about the Koran so we do not venerate this text”.101 She further states 
that “I never teach Muslim children in our school about Christianity. Do we want Sudan to be a 
Communist society? If we teach the children various religious traditions they will end up not 
believing in anything and become communists”.102 
 
In our discussion with Abdul Rahman Ali, head of the shura council of the NCP, he acknowledges 
the fact that non-Muslims do not have access to the media and clearly sympathises with their cause. 
However, with regard to education he claims that the Christian schools do teach Christianity to 
Muslim children. He states: “There are accusations from Christians that Islam is forced upon them 
in the educational curriculum. It is, however, the same in Christian schools. There they would teach 
Christianity. I have several friends who have had children in Christian schools and their children 
got Christian religious instruction”.103 
 
                                                     
101 Interview with Sister Margareth, vice chairman of the non-governmental organisation Christians and Muslims for 
Peace (CAMP), active in the main Catholic Church in Khartoum, on 26 February 2007 in Khartoum. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Interview with Abd al-Rahman Ali, head of the shura council of the NCP, a member of the Islamic Jurisprudence 
Council and working at Khartoum International Academy, on 28 February 2007 in Khartoum.. 
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3. The Rights of Women  
During the peace process in Sudan women were merely “guests at the table. The role permitted to 
women during negotiations was based on a perception of them as passive victims of war, not active 
players in politics and society”, says Anne Itto, one of few female ministers in the government. She 
calls the CPA signed on 9 January 2005 “a gender-blind agreement”.104 There is an implicit notion 
that references to human rights and justice encompass all citizens. 
 
Because the CPA is written in terms of an abstract gender-blind citizen, it appears equitable. But the 
Sudanese conception of citizenship differs from the Western understanding of it. In Sudan and the 
Middle East generally, there is a sharp distinction between a person’s “public” rights regulating, for 
example, political rights and the “private” rights regulating civil rights such as marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, maintenance and financial custody of children, and alimony.105  
 
In the name of religious freedom, the CPA and the national interim constitution have left the 
“private” civil rights of women to the country’s religious communities – Islamic, Christian, and 
traditional African beliefs. What are the consequences of this “religious freedom” for the civil rights 
of Sudanese women? Civil rights are perhaps most tangible and important in the daily lives of 
ordinary Sudanese women. Yet, there are no official recommendations or guidelines as to how the 
religious and tribal laws should be applied and interpreted. It is up to the religious communities 
themselves to form and apply the family laws regulating women’s civil rights.  
 
This creates plural legalities for Sudanese women since they are granted different civil rights 
depending on which religious community they belong to. Our findings suggest that the family laws 
as applied today discriminate against women. There are segments within the religious and tribal 
laws in today’s Sudan which disadvantage women and prevent them from participating in society 
on an equal footing with men.  
 
Despite the fact that most Sudanese elite women deem their current “rights status” as 
discriminatory, they do not demand a secular law on women’s civil rights. They are aware of 
“constraints placed upon women because of their gender and attempts to remove these constraints 
and to evolve a more equitable gender system involving new roles of women and new relations 
between men and women” through “change from within”. They promote changing and expanding 
their rights from within the religious and tribal legal regime. However, they actively use 
international conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW).  
3.1 The National Interim Constitution: Steps in the Right Direction? 
In contrast to the CPA, the national interim constitution is “gender sensitive”. The bill of rights in 
the constitution (articles 15 and 32) explicitly ensures women and men equal rights. Sudanese 
women view the interim national constitution as a step in the right direction. Now, they feel that 
they have a “voice” as citizens.  
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Article 15 on family, women and marriage, maintains that the state should “emancipate women 
from injustice and promote gender equality”. Article 32 on equal rights for men and women 
advocates that “the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights 
and all social, cultural and economic rights, including the right of equal pay for equal work, shall 
be ensured”. As such, it represents an improvement in terms of women’s rights in Sudan. In 
contrast to former Sudanese constitutions, which according to Sondra Hale historically have 
“carved an image of Sudanese women as entitled to rights but vulnerable and in need of 
protection”, the interim national constitution addresses women as citizens.106  
 
The nationality issue represents a milestone and a new right for Sudanese women. In the first 
Nationality Law of 1957, nationality was to be granted to an individual based on the nationality of 
the father. Only a child with an unknown father could claim the nationality of the mother. The 1993 
Nationality Act made few changes. Again, the only way a woman could pass on her nationality to 
her child is when the child is born out of wedlock. If a woman was married to a foreign national, 
she could not pass on her nationality to her child – even if her spouse consented. The child remained 
a foreigner until adulthood. A husband could pass on his nationality to his wife, but not the reverse. 
For the first time in Sudan’s history, the CPA and the national interim constitution ensures that 
“every person born to a Sudanese mother or father shall have a non-alienable right to enjoy 
Sudanese nationality and citizenship”. 
 
However, the government “gives with one hand and takes with the other hand”, says Balghis al-
Badri, the head of the Institute of Women, Gender and Development Studies at Afhad University 
for Women.107 In reality, there is no equality before the law either between men and women or 
between Sudanese women across religious and tribal affiliation. Anne Itto says that there is an 
internal contradiction in the national interim constitution: “There are articles […] that recognise 
customs, traditions and religion as sources of moral strength for the Sudanese people […] Yet some 
customs and traditions have contributed to the marginalisation of women”.108 So, this 
discriminatory system of legal pluralism contradicts the bill of rights in both the interim national 
constitution (articles 15 and 32) and the constitution of southern Sudan (article 20).109 
 
                                                     
106 Hale, Sondra. “The Islamic State and Gendered Citizenship in Sudan”, in S. Joseph (ed) Gender and Citizenship in the 
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THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE 1 Nature of the State  
The Republic of the Sudan is a sovereign, democratic, decentralized, multi-cultural, multi racial, multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious, and multi-lingual State; committed to the respect and promotion of human dignity and
founded on justice, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. It is an all embracing
homeland wherein races and cultures coalesce and religions co-exist in harmony;  
ARTICLE 6 Religious Rights  
The State shall respect the following religious rights:  
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief and to establish and maintain places for
these purposes,  
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions,  
(c) To make, acquire and use the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion
or belief,  
(d) To write, issue and disseminate religious publications,  
(e) To teach religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes,  
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and private and public
institutions, 
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and 
standards of any religion or belief,  
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of
religious beliefs,  
(i) To communicate with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at national and 
international levels. 
ARTICLE 7 Nationality and Citizenship  
(1) Citizenship shall be the basis for equal rights and duties for all Sudanese;  
(2) Every person born to a Sudanese mother or father shall have a non-alienable right to enjoy Sudanese 
nationality and citizenship;  
(3) The law shall regulate citizenship and naturalization; no naturalized Sudanese shall be deprived of his /her
acquired citizenship except in accordance with the law;  
(4) A Sudanese national may acquire a nationality of another country as shall be regulated by law. 
ARTICLE 15 Family, Women and Marriage  
(1) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to the protection of law; the
right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized, according to
their respective family laws, and no marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the
intending spouses; 
(2) The State shall emancipate women from injustice, promote gender equality and encourage the role of 
women in family and public life. 
ARTICLE 32 Equal Rights of Men and Women  
The equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights and all social, cultural and
economic rights, including the right of equal pay for equal work, shall be ensured. 
 
 
Another important improvement emphasised by Sudanese women is the fact that the dress code has 
been far less strict since the peace agreement than before.110 In 1992 an effort was made to legislate 
codes of dress and conduct for women, but the Public Order Code 1992 failed to pass the state 
legislature. However, ministerial regulations were issued providing that female employees should 
be properly dressed. Furthermore, the Criminal Act 1991 includes a provision in Section 152 (1) 
stipulating that “whoever commits an indecent act or an act that breaches public morality or wears 
clothes that are indecent or would breach public morality which causes annoyance to public 
feelings is liable to forty lashes or fine or both punishments”.111 In October 1996, a Public Order 
Code was adopted for the state of Khartoum. Its provisions include the forced separation of men and 
women in public places and on public transportation, as well as in private gatherings. Muslim 
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women we interviewed claimed that since the peace agreement, the authorities have been less prone 
to demand the strict Islamic dress code. A Muslim woman working in the government stated that a 
couple of years ago she would always put a tight headscarf under her thawb (the long material 
Sudanese Muslim women wrap around their bodies and loosely over the head). In the last year she 
has, however, often taken off her headscarf; instead, her head is loosely covered by part of her 
thawb only.112 Nonetheless, there are still reports about incidents at the Afhad University for 
Women, where the police have harassed students who have not dressed “properly”.113 According to 
Mariam al-Mahdi, “in Sudan, you judge people by looks. She says women’s perception of religion 
varies according to age; older women underline relations between people whereas younger people 
underline dress code. This has happened because religion has been politicised in Sudan”. So now a 
situation has been created where “each man feels responsible for each woman to see to that she 
behaves well”.114 Although there has been an improvement in this area, it should be noted that the 
law itself still has legal force in today’s Sudan.  
3.2 The State, Religion and Legal Pluralism  
Legal pluralism in the Middle East and Northern Africa reflects the existence of multiple sources of 
legislative and judicial authority that regulate and implement family laws applied to citizens 
according to their religious affiliation. A person’s civil status (ahwal madaniyya) denotes an 
individual’s rights and obligations in the public sphere that are regulated within civil law (qawanin 
al-ahwal al-madaniyya); a person’s relationship within the family or the private sphere is regulated 
by laws that govern his or her personal status (ahwal shakhsiyya). This contrasts with classic 
Western legal thought in which there is no conceptual separation between public and private rights. 
The standardisation of the legal domain in the Middle East and Northern Africa has therefore 
historically been divided between a decentralised peripheral judicial system which is responsible for 
family law and a centralised state judicial system which manages all other legal areas. The state has 
abdicated from forming and applying family laws and thus there has been no state authority over the 
personal affairs of citizens.115 This practice might be traced back to the millet system established 
under the Ottoman Empire. The millet system has a long history in the Middle East, and is closely 
linked to Islamic rules on the treatment of non-Muslim minorities (dhimmi). The Ottoman term 
specifically refers to the separate legal courts pertaining to family law through which minorities 
were allowed to rule themselves. The legal pluralities in Sudan are naturally shaped by historical, 
social and political factors both in terms of substance and application, including colonial legacy, a 
historically Arab- and Muslim-dominated central government and the long-lasting civil wars (1955-
1972 and 1983-2005).  
 
In Sudan, religious courts have existed in parallel with civil courts since independence in 1956 (and 
before).116 The legal practice was basically ignored during the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, as it 
is by peacebuilders today. After the British gained control of Sudan in 1899, two sets of courts 
functioned: family law was dealt with in religious courts whereas other aspects were handled by 
what the British chose to call civil law.117 At that time the sharia courts were subordinate to the civil 
courts, but after independence an Islamisation of the legal system was initiated and in 1967 the 
sharia Courts Act was passed. In 1972 the Judicial Authority Act was passed, effectively merging 
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113 Conversation with an Afhad student on 1 March 2007 in Omdurman. 
114 Interview with Mariam al-Mahdi on 18 February 2007 in Omdurman.  
115 Liv Tønnessen ”Gendered Citizenship in Sudan: Competing Perceptions of Women’s Civil Rights within the Family 
Laws among Northern and Southern Elites in Khartoum”, CMI woking paper (2007:4) presented at the workshop Plural 
Legalities in June 2007 in Bergen. [The article is submitted to the Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies for 
publication].  
116 Carolyn  Fluehr-Lobban, Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan (London: Frank Cass, 1987). 
117 Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan (London: Frank Cass, 1987). 
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the civil and sharia courts.118 The history of the sharia in the Sudan is inseparable from the 
successive governments which have ruled the country. In Islamic family law, judicial circulars 
(manshurat) issued by Qadi al-Quda (first issued in 1916) had served to instruct the application of 
the sharia since before independence in 1956. The Maliki school (madhab) prevailed until Sudan 
was consolidated into the Ottoman empire, during which time the Hanafi school became dominant 
school. Under the authoritarian rule of Numayri the sharia was implemented in September 1983 as 
the sole source of all law. This involved the full application of the hudud (the canonical penalties of 
the sharia). However, it was not until the Islamist coup d’état in 1989 and the subsequent Muslim 
Personal Act passed in 1991 that Islamic family law was in fact codified and that Muslim women’s 
civil rights were regarded as the responsibility of the Islamic state. For non-Muslims, there only 
exists a law from 1926 regulating marriage, whereas the other areas of family law are not codified. 
This might partly be explained by the above-mentioned millet system during the Ottoman Empire. 
More importantly for Sudan was the prolonged civil war. The policies of successive governments 
have been a pursuit of Islamisation and Arabisation. By codifying or even recognising traditional 
law in the peripheries, the centre would simultaneously give up its project of creating an Islamic 
nation.  
 
Family matters in the greater Khartoum area today are dealt with by three types of religious court: 
the sharia courts, the Christian/civil courts and the traditional courts. The judges in these courts are 
registered and paid by the state. Many of the traditional courts are, however, unofficial.  
3.3 Sharia 
With the coup d’état by the Islamists in 1989, Islam became the sole voice in the state. For the first 
time in Sudan’s history, Islamic family law was codified in 1991. The Islamic family law is perhaps 
the most applied and tangible element of the sharia in Sudan. This has made women’s civil rights 
the political battleground between different groups within the Islamic community and the Islamic 
state. Virtually all opposition politicians deem the codified sharia to be discriminatory against 
women. They thereby try to “react against a state that attempted to usurp some of their rights in 
law and constitution in the name of Islam”. The concept “oppositional consciousness” might be 
used to describe how they are able to “read the current situation of power” and to choose and adapt 
the ideological form best suited to push against its configurations.119 As such, for devising strategies 
for opposing social and political injustice non-violently religious actors are able to draw upon and 
redefine the religious tradition’s ethical warrants for resistance against what they perceive as unjust 
conditions (see chapter 1, Religion and Peacebuilding).  
 
The relationship between the Islamic state and the Muslim majority is complex and politically 
inflamed. But because of the codification of Islamic family law in 1991, Muslim women have a 
state with which to negotiate new rights. However, the Islamic state does not function as a 
gatekeeper of the rights of women, but merely defends its own position. Women’s rights are a 
battleground, reflecting the different positions of the power holders at any given time.  
 
Nonetheless, there seems to be room for reinterpretations of Islamic family law itself that expand 
the rights of women and simultaneously show that the Islamically defined family law is not in and 
by itself discriminatory against women. There is thus a plurality of perceptions of women’s civil 
rights within Islamic family law in Sudan. However, there are few female interpreters of Islam in 
Sudan120 and so far reinterpreting women’s civil rights within the framework of Islam has been 
                                                     
118 Sondra Hale, Gender Politics in Sudan: Islamism, Socialism and the State (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996). 
119Balghis Al-Badri, "Moslem Feminism in Sudan: A Critical Review," in Islamic feminism (Barcelona: 2006), p. 10. 
120 Aisha Ghabshawi and Souad al-Fatih are mujtahids (female interpreters of Islam). Both belong to the NCP and do not 
challenge the regime’s stance on women’s rights.  
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limited to men who, according to Sondra Hale (2001), lack vision and coherency for a gender 
egalitarian Sudan.  
3.3.1 The Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991 
The Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991 (qanun al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya lil-muslimin lil-sana 
1991) represents the ruling NCP’s interpretation of women’s civil rights in the Islamic family law. 
 
The Law is built on the notion of the core family as the basic unit. The guiding principle in family 
disputes is reconciliation, particularly in families with children. The Supreme Court judge and 
member of the Islamic jurisprudence council Rabab Abu Ghazayza confirms: “we do everything to 
keep the family together”.121 There are two important elements in the law which explain the 
inequality before the law between men and women. The first is patriarchy, in terms of which the 
man is the head of the family,122 and the second is patrilineality, under which the children belong to 
the father in name and in responsibility.123  
 
Marriage 
The age of consent for marriage is puberty. According to the law, both parties have to consent to 
marriage. However, the woman needs a guardian (wali) to validate the marriage. The bridegroom is 
obliged to give the bride a dowry. The Law explicitly states that the dowry is considered the 
property of the wife.124  
 
The man is the breadwinner of the family.125 A man can deny his wife the right to work outside the 
home, even in cases where he himself fails in his financial obligation.126  
 
A man is also allowed to marry up to four wives, although he has to treat all his wives justly.127 
Moreover, a man can marry four wives without providing evidence that he is financially capable of 
supporting more than one wife.128 
 
Divorce 
A husband can divorce (talaq) his wife outside the court for no reason whatsoever. The divorce will 
come into force when he utters the divorce sentence “I divorce you”. The husband has the right to 
take the wife back if he revokes the divorce sentence within the idda. Idda is a waiting period of 
three months after the divorce.  
 
The wife can only obtain a divorce in court (tatliq: a divorce granted by a judge) on certain 
conditions stipulated by the law. They are: (1) if the husband fails to fulfil his financial obligation to 
support her; (2) if her husband has more than one wife and she can prove that her husband does not 
treat all his wives justly; (3) if the husband has a defect she did not know about before marriage; (4) 
                                                     
121 Interview with Rabab Abu Ghazayza, Supreme Court judge and member of the Islamic jurisprudence council, on 22 
February 2007 in Khartoum [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
122 Article 52 of the Personal Status Law for Muslims (1991) states that the wife is obliged to obey her husband 
123 It is interesting to note in the Personal Status Law how the husband’s obligations towards the wife are described in 
practical terms: he is the breadwinner and he should allow his wife to visit her relatives. It is also specifically mentioned 
that neither should the husband interfere with the wife’s personal money nor should he harm her. As for the wife’s 
obligations towards her husband, the caring aspect is emphasised. The wife should care for her husband, obey him, and 
preserve his secrets and his money. See articles 51 and 52 of the Personal Status Law for Muslims (1991). 
124 Articles 27-28 of the Personal Status Law for Muslims (1991). 
125 Article 51 of the Personal Status Law for Muslims (1991). 
126 According to a female judge, who prefers to be anonymous, a husband can deny his wife the right to work or to go out 
of the house based on Articles 91 to Article 95 of the Personal Status Law for Muslims (1991). 
127 Article 51(d) of the Personal Status Law for Muslims (1991). 
128 Discussions with judges, males and females at the sharia court in Khartoum [the authors’ translation from Arabic].  
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if the husband suffers from an incurable mental illness; (5) if the husband is impotent; (6) if he 
behaves cruelly; (7) if he is abroad for more than one year; and (8) if the husband is sentenced to 
prison for more than two years.  
 
The wife can also obtain a divorce if a judge declares her to be disobedient (nushuz) to her 
husband.129  
 
Alimony 
The wife is entitled to financial maintenance up to six months after the divorce. The husband is the 
financial provider for the children even when they are under the custody of the mother. The father is 
financially responsible for his daughters until marriage and for his sons until they provide for 
themselves. 
 
Custody 
The mother has custody (hadana) of her daughters until they are 9 years old and of her sons until 
they are 7 years old. After this, the principle “the best interests of the child” (maslaha al-tifl) applies 
in some cases. But if the woman remarries, the father will automatically get custody of the children.  
 
Inheritance 
The inheritance laws are in accordance with the classical sharia. A woman inherits half of the 
property of her brother(s). The reasoning behind the inheritance law is that the husband is the 
breadwinner of the family. So a woman’s inheritance is then considered her own property, while a 
man’s inheritance will be used to fulfil his financial obligations within the family.  
 
Judge Abu Gazayza130 sees two major improvements for Muslim women after the codification of 
the Islamic Family law compared to previous sharia rulings in Sudan. Firstly, a wife can obtain a 
divorce if the husband has a defect (ayb) if she did not know about it before marriage. Secondly, 
before 1991 the principle “house of obedience” (bayt al-ta’a) prevailed. This principle meant that if 
the wife left the house of her husband and he wanted her back, she would have to return against her 
will. In fact, the police would bring her back by force if she did not come voluntarily. “Today”, Abu 
Ghazayza says, “the principle of obedience is still in the law, but the wife does not have to go back 
if she does not want to”. In other words, the police do not compel the wife to return to her 
husband’s house by force. The codified law shows that Muslim women and men do not have equal 
citizenship rights in Sudan. The Islamic family law does not provide equality before the law 
between Muslim men and women. This does not mean, however, that the Islamic family law is in 
and by itself discriminatory against women. The opposition demands a total reform of the current 
codified Islamic family law through reinterpretation (ijtihad) of Islam. When the sharia is 
interpreted in a liberal manner, women have rights. 
3.3.2 Contemporary Views on the Islamic Family Law 
In general, our impression is that most opposition politicians and academicians want to keep the 
plural legal system in respect of Islamic family law, but they object to the regime’s interpretation of 
the law. Even Nugud, the leader of the SCP, states that “Islam cannot be ignored when it comes to 
the family law” and simultaneously he says that he wants to “modernise the sharia”.131 There is a 
general perception that “sharia is good for women”.132 Aziza Hassanein, an expert on sharia law, 
poses the rhetorical question “why take the bad interpretation when there is a good one?”133 
                                                     
129 Articles 151-203 of the Personal Status Law for Muslims (1991). 
130 Interview with Rabab Abu Ghazayza [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
131 Interview with Mohammed Ibrahim Nugud. 
132 Interview with Aziza Hassanien, a lawyer and member of the Women Initiative Group, on 5 March 2007 in Khartoum. 
133 Ibid. 
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Equally, Sonia Malik from Afhad University for Women does not find a problem with the sharia as 
such, but with the fact that “they [men] take the hardest interpretations and apply it”. Sadiq al-
Mahdi, the leader of the UP, describes the codified Personal Status Law for Muslims as “backward 
and unacceptable. It treats women as second class citizens and it is based on the old concept of 
exclusive male control”. He calls for reform of the family law like in Morocco.134  
 
In today’s Sudan all the northern-based political parties advocate their interpretation of the sharia, 
more specifically Islamic family law. So what the sharia says concerning women’s rights depends 
on who interprets the sharia. Islam in Sudan is thus very much multivocal. There exist multiple and 
competing visions of Islam in Sudan. 
 
Ali al-Sayed, a Member of Parliament for the DUP and a sharia judge, interprets the sharia in a way 
that enhances women’s rights when compared to the codified law. For example, he stated that in his 
opinion “a woman should have an equal right to divorce. She does not need a reason to divorce. 
Both the man and the woman need to go to court to get a divorce”. He further believes that when it 
comes to custody, the man should not automatically get custody after the boy is 7 years old and the 
girl is 9 years old as the present law stipulates, but “the person best capable of taking care of the 
children should get custody”. Moreover, he claims that the DUP “is against polygamy, because this 
is not sharia”. He goes on to say that in contrast to the current law, he believes that a woman should 
be considered equal to a man as a witness in court. Sudan is in fact one of the first and few countries 
to have female judges in sharia courts.135 He asked us: “isn’t it ironic that a woman can be a judge 
in Sudan, but she cannot be a witness by herself”.136 Although the current codified law does not 
guarantee Muslim women equal rights with men, al-Sayid illustrates that religiously defined laws 
are not discriminatory against women in and by themselves.137  
 
Generally, the Islamists in power from the NCP and in opposition from the PNC seem to accept the 
codified sharia family law.138 However, Addam Bashir Rahma from the PNC told us in an interview 
that “[We have to] revise the family law; the interpretation is loose and set by men”. As the 
political advisor to Hassan al-Turabi, this critique is somewhat of a paradox in that the Personal 
Status Law for Muslims (1991) was engineered during Turabi’s period in office (1989-1999). The 
female followers of Turabi also voiced a critique of the law concerning the absolute male right to 
children after divorce.139  
                                                     
134 Interview with Sadiq al-Mahdi. In Morocco a new family law was introduced in 2004. Among the reforms are: 
“Husband and wife share joint responsibility for the family; The wife is no longer legally obliged to obey her husband; 
The minimum age of marriage is 18 for both men and women; Women of 18 and over are free to marry without the 
permission of a male family member; The right to divorce is a prerogative of both men and women,” ”Morocco’s new 
family law: the main reforms”. Found at: http://mondediplo.com/2004/04/02morocco 
135 We interviewed Badria Sulayman Abbas, the chairperson of the National Legislation and Justice Committee, who 
campaigned for female judges already under Numayri. She regards herself as a mujtahid (an Islamic scholar who makes 
ijtihads). According to Abbas, she was the one who convinced the Islamists that women can be muftis (Islamic scholars 
issuing fatwas) according to the Islamic texts. “I wrote a paper”, she said, “where I showed that women used to make 
fatwas in Islamic history, and from being a mufti to becoming a judge (qadi) is not very far.” At the present time there are 
approximately 70 female judges in Sudan. Interview with Badria Sulayman Abbas, the chairperson of the National 
Legislation and Justice Committee on 21 February 2007 in Khartoum. 
136 Interview with Ali al-Sayid, a Member of Parliament for the DUP and a sharia judge, on 25 February 2007 in 
Khartoum [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
137 Liv Tønnessen ”Gendered Citizenship in Sudan: Competing Perceptions of Women’s Civil Rights within the Family 
Laws among Northern and Southern Elites in Khartoum”, CMI woking paper (2007:4) presented at the workshop Plural 
Legalities in June 2007 in Bergen. [The article is submitted to the Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies for 
publication]. 
138 Discussions with women activists in the International Muslim Women Union (IMWU) at various occasions in 
February 2007 in Khartoum, Sudan [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
139 Their criticism was vague, indicating a lack of profound knowledge or experience of the Personal Status Law for 
Muslims (1991). Discussion with a group of female followers of Turabi on 27 February in Khartoum [the authors’ 
translation from Arabic].  
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In the law, there is little indication of Turabi’s “progressive” views on women’s issues, despite the 
fact that he had the option to implement these reforms when he was in power between 1989 and 
1999. Turabi is known to be ahead of the Islamist discourse on women’s issues. In 1973, Turabi 
wrote a booklet in which he discussed the role of women in Muslim society. It is interesting to note 
that other Islamic scholars at that time declared him an apostate because of his views on women.140 
In the booklet, Turabi recommends granting women full equality with men with regard to rights, 
including the right to be admitted to any public position, including the judiciary. During the time of 
the Prophet, women took an active role in public life, occasionally as warriors in battle but more 
frequently by participation in political affairs, Turabi maintains. Women should therefore be 
admitted to the army to fulfil administrative and even combat functions. Turabi argues that “a 
believer will not be treated unfairly merely for his gender. God treats all human beings on an equal 
basis”. This implies that women and men have the same obligations and rights according to the 
sharia and they are counterparts as “the underlying presumption in the sharia is that gender is 
immaterial”.141 He thus demonstrates that the lack of women’s fundamental rights throughout the 
Muslim world should not necessarily be ascribed to Islam, but instead it depends on who interprets 
the sharia and how this interpretation in turn is used. According to Turabi, many juridical rules have 
been adopted to qualify the sharia to suit cherished customs and traditions. Another tricky approach 
is to read liberally and broaden the scope of rules granting authority to men, while reading literally 
and strictly those imposing limitations on women, he says. This discriminatory interpretation is 
widespread and its adopters tendentiously opt for an understanding that suits their prejudice and 
subsequently the basic rights of women have been forsaken, Turabi maintains. The lack of women’s 
rights does thus not lie with the religion itself, according to Turabi, but comes from the deviation 
from the Islamic ideal in the actual history of Muslim societies. In the autumn of 2006 Turabi again 
went public with a new controversial idea. He claimed that Muslim women have the Islamic right to 
marry Christian and Jewish believing men. Turabi exclaimed that he had discovered this by 
scrutinising the Koran and the hadiths, saying “I cannot find anything in the Koran indicating a 
prohibition against Muslim women marrying believing men”.142 Similarly, as for previous 
statements on women’s issues, the Islamic scholars in Sudan and outside Sudan, including some of 
the members of his women’s group claim that the fatwa is “un-Islamic”. Interestingly enough, even 
Muslims in Norway objected to this fatwa.143 However, in interviews with Turabi it becomes clear 
that although he advocates for “freedom of women”, as he puts it, he also states quite firmly that 
men “have to make sure that they [women] use their freedom in a right way”.144  
3.3.3 Female Circumcision 
Female circumcision or female genital mutilation (FGM) has been and continues to be a widespread 
practice in northern Sudan.145 The staff at Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman has engaged 
themselves against female circumcision for a long time.146 Now, the Muslim elites are stating more 
frequently that this practice is against the sharia. In our opinion, this represents a new and positive 
step in the discourse on Muslim women’s rights in Sudan. We have observed an obvious change in 
                                                     
140 See Anne Sofie Roald, Women in Islam. The Western Experience (London: Routledge, 2001).  
141 Hassan al-Turabi, “Al- Mar`a bayna Ta’alim al-Din wa Taqalid al-Mujtama’” (Khartoum, 1973), p. 6, 11 [the authors’ 
translation from Arabic]. 
142 Interview with Hassan al-Turabi. 
143 “To norske muslimer om Turabi”, Morgenbladet, 2006. Found at: 
http://www.morgenbladet.no/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060630/OAKTUELT/106300020&SearchID=7327504963144
2”  
144 Interview with Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the PNC, on 13 November 2006 in Khartoum (Tønnessen).  
145 Afhad University for Women. Found at http://www.ahfad.org/  
146 Ahmed Magied and Ayat al-Fatih Makki, “Knowledge and Attitudes of Sudanese Youth toward Female Genital 
Mutilation/Female Circumcision (FGM/FC)”, Afhad Journal Vol 21 No 1 June 2004. 
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attitude towards female circumcision. Female circumcision had a strong position in the 1990s. 
Today, there is an Islamically based opposition against it.  
 
Infibulations have been a common and widespread practice in Sudan. It involves the removal of the 
clitoris, the Labia Minor and the Labia Major and the stitching together of the sides of the abdomen, 
leaving only a small hole for the urine to pass. This type of practice is in Sudan called “pharaonic 
circumcision”, indicating a non-Islamic origin. Even in the 1990s the Islamists characterised 
infibulation as a cultural and not an Islamic phenomenon. They regarded the clitoridectomy, or the 
cutting of the prepuce of the clitoris, as the correct Islamic circumcision. They named it the “sunna 
circumcision” or khafad [e.g. reduce or diminish]. In the 1990s we (Roald) discovered that female 
Islamists were generally in favour of either “pharaonic circumcision” or the “sunna circumcision”.  
 
There were, however, exceptions: Wisal al-Mahdi, supported by her husband Turabi and her brother 
Sadiq al-Mahdi, opposed female circumcision fiercely.147 She claimed that her great-grandfather al-
Mahdi in the 19th century was a strong opponent of female circumcision and legitimised his position 
within the frame of Islam.148 Her main argument against female circumcision was that Koran 
prohibits human beings from changing the creation of God (khalqulla). “In Sudan”, she claimed, 
“we have fought against this practice for years, but education and illumination and Islamic 
knowledge are the only means to put an end to it”. But ”definitely it will take years and years to 
change this practice in Sudan”, she said. 
 
Many of the same Islamist women who promoted female circumcision to whom Roald spoke in the 
late 1990s have in 2007 taken a stand against the practice. One of the main reasons for this was a 
lecture in Sudan by a British-Egyptian lawyer who claimed that female circumcision was against 
Islam. “And he was convincing”, Ihsan al-Ghabshawi, the head of the International Muslim Women 
Union (IMWU), said.149 The NGO organisation Civil Society headed by the Islamic feminist, 
Amnah Rahman, is working for the abolition of female circumcision. Rahman is campaigning 
against the practice with Islamic arguments. She claims that the hadiths (Prophetic traditions) used 
by proponents for the practice are not reliable and that “the Islamic message” has been interpreted 
in “a wrong way”. According to Rahman, illiterate Sudanese and adherents of the Ansar al-Sunna 
movement are still practising infibulation, whereas others have abandoned the practice or are 
practising the sunna circumcision. “There were famous Islamic scholars in the 18th and 19th 
centuries who wrote against female circumcision”, she claims, “and we use their argumentation in 
our campaign against the practice”.150 
 
During our visit to Khartoum in 2007, the presidential advisor for sharia affairs, Ahmad Ali al-
Imam started to speak, unsolicited, about female circumcision. We interpret this as an indication on 
how the international and the recent Sudanese opposition to FGM have had an impact on the regime 
and thereby made them sensitive towards international actors. Al-Imam stated that in Sudan 
infibulation is prohibited by law, but that khafad was an option; “it is up to every parent to decide 
                                                     
147 Interview with Wisal al-Mahdi, the wife of Hassan al-Turabi and the sister of Sadiq al-Mahdi, in December 1997 in 
Sana’a, Yemen. See also Anne Sofie Roald, Women in Islam. The Western Experience (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 238. 
148 With the establishment of the Mahdist state (1881-98), al-Mahdi introduced sharia as territorial law in the centre of 
today’s Sudan. His followers adopted the name “Ansar”, a group which even today has a great influence on Sudanese 
politics through its association with the biggest political party, namely the UP. Al-Mahdi abolished Sufi Islam, to which 
historically speaking the majority of Sudanese Muslims adhere. One of the major Sufi groups, the Khatmiyya, has been 
linked to the second largest political party in Sudan, namely the DUP, since its establishment. The Mahdists made a great 
effort to Islamise southern Sudan, a legacy which successive governments after independence in 1956 continued to 
uphold.  
149 Interview with Ihsan al-Ghabshawi, head of the International Muslim Women Union (IMWU) and a former Minister of 
Health under the Islamist regime, on 20 February 2007 in Khartoum [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
150 Interview with Amna Rahman, the General Secretary of the NGO Civil Society, on 17 February 2007 in Khartoum. 
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for themselves”, he said.151 According to Samira al-Mahdi, a member of the executive body of the 
DUP, the current regime is “un-Islamic” because it mixes culture with religion concerning women’s 
rights. She refers here to the fact that they allow the sunna circumcision or khafad. In her opinion all 
forms of female circumcision are “un-Islamic”.152 
3.3.3 CEDAW and “Changing Islamic Family Law from Within” 
Southern Sudanese elite women advocate ratifying CEDAW without reservations. In their opinion, 
the main reason why Sudan has not yet ratified the convention is because of Islam. They are partly 
correct in that the conservative perception of women’s civil rights within Islam propagated by the 
regime is not in harmony with CEDAW.  
 
But the debate over the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) has become a bargaining area between the northern political parties on 
what the sharia says concerning women’s rights within the Islamic family law. This shows inter-
legality between Islamic and Western legal thought, thus that they are in fact intertwined with each 
other, constituting each other dialectically, rather than being the autonomous or semi-autonomous 
legalities we sometimes see them as being. Islam is a discursive religion undertaking continuing 
change and thus transforms the sharia in encounters with, for instance, Western legal norms.153 
 
Article 16 of CEDAW asserts that states should “take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations”. In other 
words, the conventions impose on the sphere of Sudanese women’s “private” civil rights within 
Islamic family law.  
 
ARTICLE 16 of CEDAW  
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all 
matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; (b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent; (c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage 
and at its dissolution; (d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital 
status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; 
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to 
have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights; (f) The 
same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of 
children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the 
interests of the children shall be paramount; (g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, 
including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation; (h) The same rights for 
both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and 
disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration.  
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, including 
legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in 
an official registry compulsory. 
 
 
                                                     
151 Interview with Ahmad Ali al-Imam, presidential advisor for sharia affairs, on 21 February 2007 in Khartoum [the 
authors’ translation from Arabic]. It is interesting to note that al-Imam is a member of the Dublin-based sharia council, the 
European Council for Fatwa and Research, headed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi. 
152 Interview with Samira al-Mahdi from the DUP in Khartoum on 16 November 2006. 
153 Argument presented in Liv Tønnessen ”Gendered Citizenship in Sudan: Competing Perceptions of Women’s Civil 
Rights within the Family Laws among Northern and Southern Elites in Khartoum”, CMI woking paper (2007:4) presented 
at the workshop Plural Legalities in June 2007 in Bergen. 
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There are Islamic forces in the country stating that there is nothing in CEDAW which is against 
sharia. It is our impression that although Sudan has not ratified CEDAW, the debate has impacted 
on the discourse on women’s rights. After the peace agreement, the leaders of the political parties 
admitted that they have considerably more “space”. Part of this space is being used to advocate for 
CEDAW, which is now a political battlefield. Whereas the SCP,154 the UP155 and the DUP156 
advocate for the ratification of CEDAW without reservations, the NCP157 and the PNC158 campaign 
for the ratification of CEDAW with reservations.  For example, the DUP,159 the UP160 and the 
SCP161 advocate that a woman should get the equal inheritance of a man as stipulated in CEDAW. 
This contradicts the traditional interpretation, and Ali al-Sayed admits that this is a debated issue 
within the DUP in particular and in Sudan generally; “if you speak about this [inheritance], you will 
go to hell”. Al-Sayed’s personal view is that “a woman should get equal inheritance to her brother, 
because the reality in Sudan is that women are working and contributing to the household, so this 
should be reflected in the inheritance. The “old” rules are stuck in an ideal world where the man is 
responsible for maintaining his wife”, he states.162  
 
The PNC163 and the ruling NCP164 uphold the traditional interpretation that a woman should get half 
the inheritance of a man and consequently argue that CEDAW thus “is against sharia”,165 but 
nonetheless maintain that “women have freedom in Islam”.166 Some of the women within the NCP 
illustrate this stance when they state that a woman and a man cannot be equal.167 They therefore 
advocate for “equity, not equality”.168 They maintain that “human rights are part of our religion”, 
but their perception of what are human rights is qualitatively different from our conception.169 In 
their view CEDAW is thus insufficient when it comes to women’s rights and they believe that the 
Islamic way is the better way. Islamists stated that “we do not need CEDAW; we have sharia, which 
gives women more rights than CEDAW”.170  
 
However, it is our impression (and that of other participants in the discourse)171 that the debate 
seems to be influenced by the fact that many participants in the discussion have not actually read the 
convention. For example, in an article on International Women’s Day, 8 March 2006, Farida 
Ibrahim, a presidential legal adviser, characterised CEDAW as “against sharia law and it does not 
                                                     
154 Interview with Mohammed Ibrahim Nugud. 
155 Interview with Sadiq al-Mahdi. 
156 Interview with Ali al-Sayid [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
157 Interview with Dr Ahmed Ali al-Imam [the authors’ translation from Arabic]; Interview with Farida Ibrahim, legal 
advisor to the president, on 21 February 2007 in Khartoum [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
158 Interview with Hassan al-Turabi. 
159 Interview with Ali al-Sayid, [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
160 Interview with Sadiq al-Mahdi; Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Huquuq Al-Islaamiyah Wa Al-Insaaniyah Lilmarra’ah (Islamic 
Rights and Human Rights for the Women) (Khartoum: Maktabah al-sharuuk al-dawliyah 2007) [the authors’ translation 
from Arabic]. 
161 Interview with Mohammed Ibrahim Nugud. 
162 Interview with Ali al-Sayid. Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Huquuq Al-Islaamiyah Wa Al-Insaaniyah Lilmarra’ah (Islamic Rights 
and Human Rights for the Women) (Khartoum: Maktabah al-sharuuk al-dawliyah 2007). 
163 Interview with Hassan al-Turabi and interview with Addam Bashir Rahma. 
164 Interview with Dr Ahmed Ali al-Imam [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
165 Discussion about inheritance at “women’s tea” meeting with Hassan al-Turabi’s female followers at Addam Bashir 
Rahma’s house on 26 February 2007 in Khartoum [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
166 Interview with Dr Ahmed Ali al-Imam [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
167 Interview with Attiyah Mustapha. 
168 Conversation with an anonymous Islamist activist from the International Muslim Women Union (IMWU) on 18 
February 2007 in Khartoum. This concept was adapted by Islamists in general as the book by the Canadian-Egyptian 
Islamist Jamal Badawi, Gender Equity in Islam (American Trust Publication) was published in 1996.  
169 Interview with Attiyah Mustapha. 
170 This was a general notion among Islamist women in Khartoum. Also, interview with Badria Sulayman Abbas, the 
chairperson of the National Legislation and Justice Committee Khartoum, on 21 February 2007 in Khartoum.  
171 Interview with Mariam al-Mahdi and Interview with Rose Paulino.  
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represent the government’s stance on women’s rights. It destroys family values, legalizes abortion 
and prostitution under the umbrella of family values, gives equality to prostitutes and married 
women and legalizes lesbianism. It is a disaster for human beings”.172  
 
In an interview, Farida Ibrahim confirmed this stance.173 It is her belief that “an American lesbian 
made the convention” and consequently that Sudan cannot possible ratify it. In our opinion, the 
convention does not say anything about gay rights or prostitution specifically; rather, it states 
(article 6) that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress 
all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women”. It was also the opinion of 
several of the women within the NCP174 and the PNC175 that it is in fact impossible to ratify the 
convention with reservations, because as times pass the UN will have the reservations removed. In 
our view this is an incorrect supposition. Most of the states in the Middle East and Northern Africa 
have in fact ratified the convention with reservations, mainly to article 16. 
 
The forces which are advocating for CEDAW are doing so because they consider it to be in 
agreement with their interpretation (ijtihad) or understanding of the sharia.176 In their view there is 
no contradiction between women’s rights and religion, it is a matter of interpreting the laws in a 
more feminist perspective. However, although certain political forces assert that they want to ratify 
the convention without reservations, they are prompt to say that they believe that the convention is 
insufficient in that it does not speak about “women’s right to religious belief”.177 Others legitimise 
their position on ratification purely on pragmatic grounds, because it “sends out the wrong signal 
politically” and because “the law does not matter in Sudan”. Afaf Ahmed Abdel Rahman states that 
although CEDAW will give her the equal inheritance of her brother, she will not accept it because 
of her religious belief.178 Mariam al-Mahdi thinks it is “embarrassing that Sudan has not ratified 
CEDAW when even Saudi Arabia has ratified it”.179 In some respects, the opposition’s eagerness to 
ratify the convention might be seen as “lip service”, according to Limiya al-Badri: “Very few 
Sudanese men are full hearted for women’s emancipation. We have learnt that we have to make 
alliances […] it is about politics. For example, when Sadiq al-Mahdi was in power he was never for 
CEDAW. Now that he is out of office he uses CEDAW to come back to power. So it is all about 
politics. I am quite sure that Sadiq al-Mahdi will upset the fundamentalists if he wins the elections; 
he will never go for CEDAW although he now says that CEDAW is not against Islam. Still I have to 
use him”.180  
 
                                                     
172 Farida Ibrahim, in Osrati (My Family, a monthly magazine published in Khartoum), March 2006. Quoted in 
International Crisis Group, “Beyond Victimhood: Women's Peacebuilding in Sudan, Congo and Uganda”. 
173 Interview with Farida Ibrahim [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
174 Interview with Attiyah Mustapha; conversation with an anonymous Islamist activist from the International Muslim 
Women Union (IMWU) on 18 February 2007 in Khartoum. 
175 Discussion about CEDAW at “women’s tea” meeting with Hassan al-Turabi’s female followers [the authors’ 
translation from Arabic]. 
176 Interview with Ali al-Sayid [the authors’ translation from Arabic]; interview with Sadiq al-Mahdi; interview with 
Mariam al-Mahdi; interview with Samira al-Mahdi; interview with Mohammed Ibrahim Nugud.  
177 Interview with Mariam al-Mahdi; Mariam Al-Mahdi, “Al-marrah wa al-din (Women and Religion)”, (Afhad 
University of Women, 2003) [the author’s translation from Arabic]. 
178 Interview with Afaf Ahmed Abdel Rahman, general manager of the Women Center for Peace and Development, on 14 
February 2007 in Khartoum. 
179 Interview with Mariam al-Mahdi; Mariam Al-Mahdi, “Al-marrah wa al-din (Women and Religion)”, (Afhad 
University of Women, 2003) [the author’s translation from Arabic]. 
180 Interview with Limiya Badri, woman activist working for the UNDP, on 16 November 2006 in Khartoum (Tønnessen). 
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3.4 Christian Family Law 
Many family issues are discussed and dealt with within the family before they become cases for the 
church or the civil court. Legislation in the civil court is mainly based on a law from 1926 which 
deals with when and how marriages for non-Muslims are legally acceptable and when and how 
marriages become void.181 The judges in the civil courts are Muslim and they often refer back to the 
community when cases are presented before them. The Christian editor Alfred Taban told us about 
the incident when he appeared before the civil court to seek a divorce from his wife. The judge 
urged the parties to contact the Christian community. The state seemingly takes no responsibility for 
the civil rights of non-Muslims. There is no codification of the civil rights of Christian women, so 
their rights vary across denomination. In Sudan, there are three main denominations: the Coptic 
Church, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Churches. 
 
The Coptic Church is the only Christian community in Sudan which has a written Christian family 
law. This law is contained within a small booklet dealing with family issues such as inheritance, 
divorce, separation between spouses, and custody of the children in cases of divorce or separation. 
The booklet is “based on the Bible as we do exactly as the Bible prescribes for us in family 
matters”.182 The other Christian churches have no written law, but claim to follow the Bible in 
family law issues.183 
 
Marriage 
All the Christian churches prohibit polygyny. Compared to the codified Islamic family law, 
Christian women do not have to accept their husband taking an additional wife. It is interesting to 
note that the Coptic priest Father Antonius continually used Islamic terms when he spoke of the 
relationship between husband and wife: “the husband has to deal with his wife in a loving manner 
(mahabba), and the wife has to obey (ta’a) her husband. There has to be respect (ihtiram) between 
the two spouses”.184 It thus seems as though the Coptic Church’s long history in Sudan has had an 
impact on the community’s discourse.  
 
Divorce 
Compared with sharia, it is in general more difficult to obtain a divorce for Christian women. The 
Coptic Church does not accept divorce except in case of adultery, “as is the Biblical rule for 
divorce”, Father Antonius states.185 A couple can separate only if it is impossible for the two parties 
to live together, but they cannot remarry except if one of the parties dies. In the Sudanese Catholic 
Church, regular abuse and mistreatment are also considered legitimate grounds for divorce. In the 
Protestant churches the only acceptable justification for divorce, as in the Coptic Church, is 
infidelity.  
 
Custody of Children 
The Coptic Church has similar rulings for the custody of children as the sharia: the daughters stay 
with the mother until the age of 9 and the sons until to the age of 7, after which the father gets 
custody of the children. 
 
 
 
                                                     
181 Marriage laws for non-Muslims from the year 1926 [15/5 1926] (qanun zawaj ghayr al-muslimin lisana 1926). 
182 Interview with Father Antonius, deputy bishop in the Coptic Orthodox Church in Omdurman, on 25 February 2007 in 
Omdurman [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
183 Interview with Bishop Deng from the Episcopal Church on 28 February 2007 in Khartoum; interview with Peter Loro 
from the Catholic Church on 28 February 2007 in Khartoum. 
184 Interview with Father Antonius [the authors’ translation from Arabic]. 
185 Ibid. 
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Inheritance 
The Coptic Church grants women more rights compared to the sharia concerning inheritance. A 
woman is entitled to equal inheritance. 
 
In contrast to Khartoum legal authorities’ belief that all Muslims follow the Islamic family law and 
all Christians follow the Christian family laws, we discovered through interviews that most 
southerners, Muslims, Christians and adherents of the various tribal religious traditions alike, prefer 
to deal with family issues within the system of customary law. Most Christian southerners belong to 
the Catholic or Protestant churches and it was thus difficult for us to obtain information on civil 
rights within the Catholic and Protestant family laws, because they were not in use. Southern 
Christian leaders in Khartoum seem to accept that southern Christians turn to the traditional court in 
cases of divorce, and even in cases of polygynous marriage.186 An interview with the leader of 
Sudan Council of Churches confirmed this impression.187 Our impression is that when it comes to 
family law, most Muslim and Christian southern Sudanese, according to those we interviewed in the 
greater Khartoum area, turn to the traditional courts and not to the civil or sharia courts.  
3.5 Customary Family Law 
Traditional courts are staffed by salatins (sing: sultan) who are respected elders and chiefs within 
the community. They enforce customary law, which is “a body of traditions, mores, social 
conventions and rules that through long usage and widespread acceptance govern traditional 
African society”. 188 At least the salatins in the traditional courts in the greater Khartoum area are 
paid by the state, but we did not discover whether this is also the case with the sultans in southern 
Sudan. According to Akechak Jok and Leitch, customary law is the principal source of social order 
and it remains the dominant source of law in contemporary southern Sudan as “over 90% of day-to-
day criminal and civil cases are executed under customary law”.189 The salatins from the Nuer tribe 
we interviewed claimed that there are many traditional courts in Khartoum dealing with customary 
law, most of which are informal.  
 
According to Rose Paulino there are more than 50 different traditional laws among the southern 
Sudanese population, but they share the basic discriminatory and patriarchal structure. We have 
interviewed representatives across tribes such as the Dinka, Nuer, Equitoria, Shilluk and the Bari.190  
 
In an interview with two local court chiefs in Khartoum, the Muslim Sultan Hassan Wijel Shatil and 
the Christian Sultan Paul, the discriminatory content of Nuer law was revealed: “The dowry starts 
at 40 cows and is given from the husband’s extended family to the wife’s extended family. If the man 
or the woman wants a divorce, the dowry is paid back. It is difficult to get a divorce. There are no 
automatic grounds for divorce like beating and impotence […] The man gets custody of the children 
no matter what age they are and who initiates the divorce […] The widow decides if she wants to 
stay in the family; if not, she will have to give back the dowry. Usually the widow marries her late 
husband’s brother. If a woman’s father dies, she will not inherit from him”.191  
                                                     
186 Interview with Bishop Deng; interview with Peter Loro; interview with Ishmael Kanane, Presbyterian, Head of 
Theological College, on 16 February 2007 in Khartoum.  
187 Interview with Mark Abeccien. 
188 See D. Kur, “Access to Traditional Justice System & the Rights of Women and Children in South Sudan”, (paper 
presented at a workshop on Legal Protection of Children at South Sudan Law Society, Rumbek, Sudan, 2000)  
189 Aleu Akechak Jok and Robert Leitch, “A Study of Customary Law in Contemporary Southern Sudan”, (the South 
Sudan Secretariat of Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2004), p. 6. Found at: 
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Sultan Hassan Wijel Shatil and Sultan Paul told us that a typical case in the traditional court 
revolves around rape: “if an unmarried girl is raped, the court sees to it that the boy marries the 
girl”.192 Violence is socially accepted, a southern Sudanese woman asserted. 193 And rape is a 
typical way to get married, says Rose Paulino.194 According to Suzanne Samson Jambo, a southern 
Sudanese: “Sudanese women have traditionally suffered from discriminatory customs and 
traditions, which relegate them to the status of lesser beings. Such negative customs and 
traditions… include forced and arranged marriages, forced wife inheritance, bride prices and 
relegation of the girl-child to a mere object which must be sold to the highest bidder, preferably at a 
tender age [….]”. 195 Agnes Nyoka Peter, a southern parliamentarian, claims that “women are the 
most marginalised of the marginalised in southern Sudan”.196  
 
The main features of family matters in customary law are thus as follows. The man pays a dowry 
(cattle; cows, horses or goats) to the wife.197 For southerners living in the greater Khartoum area, the 
cattle are handed over to members of the extended family living in southern Sudan. If a divorce 
occurs, independent of which party instigated the divorce, the dowry has to be paid back to the man. 
The dowry includes the original cattle and their offspring. If the husband dies, the wife is not 
entitled to inheritance and she would have to marry a younger brother or relative of the husband to 
keep the dowry in her (original) extended family. If she prefers to leave her deceased husband’s 
family, she would have to hand back the dowry. How much has to be handed back in this latter case 
depends on how long time the couple has been married and how old the children are. If the wife 
dies at an early stage of the marriage, her family has to give back the dowry.  
3.5.1 Comparing Customary Law with the Sharia 
Clearly, women have different obligations and rights both under the sharia and traditional laws. The 
delegation of women’s civil rights to Islamic and traditional family law has thus led to the absence 
of equality before the law not only between men and women in general but also between Sudanese 
women across religious and tribal affiliations. When dealing with women’s (civil) rights, Norway 
along with the international community focuses on Islam. Consequently they overlook 
discriminatory practices within other religious and tribal communities. This is problematic, because 
in certain areas Islamic family law in Sudan might actually be considered less discriminatory than in 
other religious and tribal communities. 
 
In contrast to the codified sharia in Sudan, which is founded on the principle of reconciliation 
within the core family, customary law is founded on the principle of reconciliation within the 
extended family. Marriage is an act involving a vast group of people. This impression is confirmed 
by Akechak Jok and Leitch: “Within Southern Sudanese society the role and status of women is 
seen as a reflection of a culture that places a premium on the cohesion and strength of the family as 
a basis of society. The male is the undisputed head of the family and marriage the means to 
                                                     
192 Ibid. 
193 Interview with an anonymous southern woman (Shilluk). 
194 Interview with Rose Paulino 
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strengthening the bonds between families and clans within tribes. The role of women in this social 
pattern is that of cementing family ties through “bride-wealth” and of producing children”.198 
 
According to customary law, a “man is allowed to take as many wives as he pleases”, whereas the 
sharia allows only four wives.199 The dowry is considered a woman’s own property in the codified 
sharia, whereas under customary law the dowry is the property of the extended family. The dowry 
rules in customary law make it difficult for a woman to obtain a divorce.200 Although it might be 
considered difficult for a woman to get a divorce in the sharia courts, it is far easier than in the 
traditional courts. Under the sharia, it is possible for a woman to initiate a divorce, if she has legal 
grounds,201 without paying back the dowry. Under customary law, on the other hand, a woman’s 
decision to initiate divorce will affect the extended family’s financial situation as they are forced to 
pay back the dowry whatever the cause of the divorce. Additionally,” there is no ‘idda period after 
the divorce” in customary law as women are entitled to under the sharia.202 According to the Nuer 
salatins, “the man gets custody of the children no matter what age they are and who initiates the 
divorce”,203 whereas women under the sharia have custody (hadana) of daughters until they are 9 
years old and of her sons until they 7 years old.204 Finally, the woman is entitled to half the 
inheritance of her brother(s) according to the sharia, whereas in customary law a woman has no 
right to inheritance whatsoever.205 In fact, “a woman is property”, according to the leader of the 
Sudan Council of Churches. “If the husband dies, she has to marry someone within the family”, he 
says.206 In other words, the family inherits her. Lucie Luguga, UNIFEM programme manager for 
Southern Sudan, says that these traditions and customs turn “a human being into a commodity”.207 
 
However, there are basic similarities between customary and sharia law. The patriarchal and 
collective pattern whereby the woman is subservient to the male head of the family is a main 
principle in both legal systems. Customary law has adopted the Islamic dia (ransom) concept, 
making it possible to buy oneself free from punishment in case of murder. This also goes for rape 
and fornication. If a girl is raped, the families sit together with the sultan to negotiate a marriage 
between the two. If the marriage is not accepted the rapist has to pay a ransom (dia). Moreover, if a 
woman is unfaithful towards her husband, the man she fornicated with has to pay the husband a 
ransom (usually 7 cows) if the husband chooses not to divorce his wife.  
 
Similar to sharia law, the husband in customary law has the right to deny the wife the right to work 
outside the home. This has been particularly problematic for displaced women in the greater 
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Khartoum area. The journalist Sabah Muhammad has made several reports about traditional court 
cases. She claims that in both sharia and customary law women have few rights. In the displaced 
areas many women’s pleas for divorce are denied by the salatins, she says. She claims that the most 
frequent reasons for a woman to ask for divorce in the customary court are money and power. She 
states: “Most often, the men in displaced areas are unemployed and the woman would work, for 
instance, with making tea and selling it in the street. She makes money so she can feed the children. 
Her husband tries to take or cheat the money from her and she goes to the Sultan suing for a 
divorce. The man would tell the Sultan that his wife has become proud because she earns money. 
The Sultan always sides with the man and he will rebuke the woman for being proud. Sometimes the 
husband will even deny her the chance to work and the Sultan accepts his words and he refuses to 
grant her a divorce. The woman has to stay with her husband; he neither supports her or the 
children, nor gives her permission to work to feed her children”.208 She goes on: “Another frequent 
case is if a woman rebukes her husband for not working or not being able to feed his family and the 
husband then complains to the Sultan. The husband would tell him that his wife has become proud 
because she earns money. The Sultan then often refuses to give his permission for the wife to work”.  
3.5.2 CEDAW and “Changing from Within” 
According to Rose Paulino, the majority of Sudanese customary law systems have the same basic 
discriminatory features, which are in conflict with international human rights. Essentially, “the 
status of women […] is that of property”.209 Nonetheless, southern elite women advocate reforming 
customary law from within and not abolishing the plural legal system altogether.210 The battle to 
“change from within” seems more difficult for southern Sudanese women. 
 
Customary law is not written law but is transmitted orally from generation to generation. Since the 
law is not written law, there is less room for a flexible reinterpretation of the text of the law so as to 
increase women’s rights within the current system. It is thus not possible for southern Sudanese 
women to change the legal system from within by reinterpreting the sources of the law itself, as 
seen in the contemporary reinterpretations of Islamic law.211 Our fieldwork deals with the legal 
framework for Sudanese women and does not map litigation processes in sharia courts and 
“traditional” courts from a gender perspective in order to reveal how Sudanese women bargain 
within the existing gendered family laws to claim their rights. The customary laws surely have a 
certain degree of flexibility, but the practice or tool of reinterpretation as historically 
institutionalised in Islam does not exist. Rose Paulina says that the salatins are now in fact resisting 
a process of mapping and writing down the different customary laws, thus indicating that they are 
mobilising against “change from within”.212 
 
Furthermore, because there is no state codification of women’s civil rights within customary law in 
Sudan, due process in traditional courts is not clearly defined, rendering women vulnerable to 
arbitrary application of the law. They thus do not have any legal protection from the state. One 
                                                     
208 Interview with Sabah Muhammad, journalist at the newspaper al-ayam, on 26 February 2007 in Khartoum. See also 
articles in the newspaper al-ayam: 1 March 2006; 17 May 2006; 31 October 2006; 22 November 2006. 
209 Paulino, "Against Women in the Theme of Customary Law", p. 7.  
210 Interview with Rose Paulino, southern activist in the Network for Southern Organisation for Peace and Development, 
on 28 February 2007 in Khartoum. 
211 Argument put forward in Liv Tønnessen ”Gendered Citizenship in Sudan: Competing Perceptions of Women’s Civil 
Rights within the Family Laws among Northern and Southern Elites in Khartoum”, CMI woking paper (2007:4) presented 
at the workshop Plural Legalities in June 2007 in Bergen. [The article is submitted to the Journal of Middle East Women’s 
Studies for publication]. 
212 Argument put forward in Liv Tønnessen ”Gendered Citizenship in Sudan: Competing Perceptions of Women’s Civil 
Rights within the Family Laws among Northern and Southern Elites in Khartoum”, CMI woking paper (2007:4) presented 
at the workshop Plural Legalities in June 2007 in Bergen. [The article is submitted to the Journal of Middle East Women’s 
Studies for publication]. 
CMI REPORT DISCRIMINATION IN THE NAME OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM R 2007: 5 
 35 
could argue that such a system, where the state has abdicated from the responsibility to implement 
customary family law, is too dependent on the responsiveness of the specific courts and the 
individual judge’s capability and gender sensitive approach.213 “The elders and the chiefs have a set 
mindset and many women give up on serious cases such as rape and abusive husbands as they 
expect no justice to be delivered to her”, claims Anne Itto.214 Furthermore, there is no justice in 
these courts, because it is “not socially accepted for women to go to the traditional courts and the 
woman often ends up being wrongly imprisoned”, says Lucie Luguga.215  
 
Because there is no codification of the customary law there is neither state control over the 
discriminatory content of traditional laws nor a state authority for southern women to negotiate new 
rights with. So for southern women CEDAW becomes even more important, because if it were 
ratified the state would for the first time be forced to take responsibility for their civil rights. 216 By 
the rhetoric of “change from within”, southern elite women signal that there are “positive” customs 
and traditions which they want to preserve. Anne Itto explains that “the customs in southern Sudan 
are what has kept the region together throughout the war in spite of religious and ethnic diversity. 
Family is important and this is a good value. The core values are peacebuilding values; songs and 
dances bring people together”.217 Simultaneously they acknowledge that some of the customs and 
traditions are discriminatory against women. Hon Mary Kiden, Minister of Gender, Government of 
Southern Sudan, says “tradition and custom prevents women from change”.218 But they emphasise 
that ratifying CEDAW is not sufficient to reverse the marginalisation of southern Sudanese women. 
Anne Itto explains that “customary law represents habit, attitude, value system, worldview and it 
takes more that a law to deal with it. Even the women at the grass roots are reluctant to change, 
because they are socialised to protect their family. Education and awareness raising among men, 
older women and younger is the key to change, but this is a long and slow process”. 219  
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Studies for publication]. 
217 Interview with Anne Itto. 
218 Presentation by Hon Mary Kiden, Minister of Gender, Government of Southern Sudan, who says that “tradition and 
custom prevents women from change”, on 4 June 2007 at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo. 
219 Interview with Anne Itto. 
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4. Lessons for the International Community 
Learning how to take religious pluralism seriously has become one of the most important aspects of 
international policy today. In the eagerness to include marginalised religious groups, Sudanese and 
international peacebuilders ignored gender issues during the negotiations. As religion has been 
perceived as a critical element in Sudan’s civil wars, this is understandable. The lessons to be learnt 
for the international community are, in our opinion, primarily in terms of discrimination against 
women in the name of religious freedom. It is vital to acknowledge the diverse and plural debates 
about human rights within the various religious communities. Religiously anchored laws are not in 
and by themselves discriminatory against women. However, the way in which the laws are 
interpreted and applied in today’s Sudan is discriminatory against women. Therefore it is important 
for Sudanese women to transform the discourse by moderate religious and tribal forces into de facto 
rights for women.  
4.1 A Comprehensive Peace for Sudanese Women? 
Gender was not on the agenda despite the international awareness about including women in 
peacebuilding. Sudanese women were merely guests at the table. In part because women were not 
involved in any substantive way, issues with a particular gender impact were not elaborated in the 
document signed on 9 January 2005. The result was a gender-blind peace agreement which at first 
glance appeared equitable because it was written in terms of an abstract gender-neutral citizen. The 
Sudanese conception of citizenship and rights differs from the Western understanding of it. In 
Sudan and the Middle East generally, there is a sharp distinction between a person’s “public” rights 
regulating, for example, political rights and the “private” rights regulating civil rights. In Sudan, 
private civil rights are the legal domain of the religious and tribal communities. In the name of 
religious freedom, the CPA and the constitution have left the private civil rights of women to the 
religious and tribal communities. This study shows that there are segments within the religious and 
tribal laws of today’s Sudan which discriminate against women and prevent them from participating 
in society on an equal footing with men. The international peacebuilders and mediators thus failed 
to provide women with fundamental human rights in their attempt to secure religious minorities 
fundamental human rights in the CPA. Civil rights are perhaps the most tangible and important 
rights in the daily lives of ordinary Sudanese women. Yet, there are no official recommendations or 
guidelines as to how the religious and tribal laws should be applied and interpreted. This leaves 
women vulnerable in a complicated patchwork of plural legalities without explicit civil rights. 
Although it is incorrect to state that religiously defined laws in and by themselves discriminatory 
against women, they do not guarantee all Sudanese women equal civil rights as they are enforced in 
today’s Sudan. It is thus important that the international community now puts women’s rights at the 
forefront. 
4.2 Change from within or from outside? 
The historically institutionalised legal system in which the different religious communities are 
responsible for the execution of family law will be difficult if not impossible to abolish completely, 
particularly considering that this is deemed an intrinsic religious freedom by Sudanese themselves. 
It is crucial not to force a secular legal reform upon Sudanese society from the outside. There needs 
to be a gender sensitive approach to the Sudanese context. The international community cannot 
view a “right” situation for women through Western glasses and blindly regard international 
conventions such as CEDAW as “the solution” to discrimination against women in today’s Sudan. 
This type of international equality policy is detached from the female life-world in countries like 
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Sudan.220 Nonetheless, Sudanese women actively use CEDAW to advocate for gender equality. But 
those who call for the ratification of CEDAW do so because in their view there is no contradiction 
between women’s rights and religion. This shows an inter-legality between religious and Western 
legal thought, thus that they are in fact intertwined with each other, constituting each other 
dialectically, rather than being the autonomous, or semi-autonomous legalities we sometimes see 
them as being.  
 
However, the international community must recognise the fact that Sudanese elite women do not 
want a secular law on women’s civil rights. They advocate “change from within”.221 The feminist 
struggle is grounded in Sudanese culture and religion, just as feminists from any society or any 
particular cultural tradition hold and internalise premises and assumptions stemming from their 
culture that shape their orientation to women issues. Any feminist model, paradigm or framework is 
largely informed by the framer’s culture.222 The international discourse on women’s rights falsely 
assumes a universality of womanhood and demonstrates a Western bias in a secular perception of 
secular rights as superior to religiously defined rights.223 
 
The report shows that there is a plurality of perceptions of “gender equality” and “women’s rights” 
in Sudan. The feminist struggle in multi-religious and multi-ethnic Sudan has many varieties. 
“There is not a single organization with the agenda of which a majority of women would agree […] 
Relishing in diversity, basking in fragmentation, enjoying the play of differences, and celebrating 
opacity, fracturing, and heteronomy”.224 Women belong to numerous overlapping groups and hold 
multiple intersecting identities.225 In contrast to much of the literature on women and peacebuilding, 
which claims that “on the basis of their women’s interests, they are able to form coalitions bridging 
deep political, ethnic and religious divides”,226 this study shows that religion is one of the 
overlapping identities among Sudanese women, effectively creating a plurality of perception of 
women’s rights.  
 
Our impression is that foreign donors erroneously regard Sudanese women as united and actively 
encourage them to present themselves as united.227 Religiously and tribally anchored rights within 
the private sphere of family law forms the backdrop against which the feminists conceive their 
rights, because it structures the life opportunities of Sudanese women. This study has showed the 
complexity of the processes defining religious rights in Sudan, not only emphasising the differences 
between the religious communities but also within the diverse and plural ideological membership of 
each religious group. “Change from within” and transformations of the tribal and religious laws on 
women’s civil status in a more gender-equal direction must be viewed in light of this. There are 
ongoing debates within the religious communities about maintaining or changing the discriminatory 
features of the religious and tribal family laws. The current debate on women’s rights, particularly 
                                                     
220 Anne Hellum, Women's Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Africa: Mixed Norms and Identities in Infertility 
Management in Zimbabwe (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1999), p. 417.  
221 Margot Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation : Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), p. 19-20.  
222 Fadwa Al-Guindi, "Gendered Resistance, Feminist Veiling, Islamic Feminism", The Afhad Journal 22, no. 1 (2005). 
223 Henrietta Moore, Feminism and Anthropology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 
224 Seyla Benhabib, Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), p. 29 [not referring to Sudan as such]. 
225 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, in D. Trend, Radical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship and the State (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 11.  
226 Tsjeard Bouta and Gerorg Frerks, "Women’s Roles in Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction", (Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2002), p. 8.  
227 The American organisers from the Initiative for Inclusive Security repeatedly stated at a workshop on political 
participation in November 2006 in Khartoum that Sudanese women should present themselves as united, because that is 
what would get them funding from the donors.  
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within the Islamic communities in Sudan, shows that gender equality might be accomplished from 
within through reinterpretation (ijtihad) of religious laws.  
 
Nonetheless, there need to be mechanisms put in place to ensure that the liberal reinterpretations are 
converted into de facto rights for women, particularly since the issue of women’s rights is a highly 
politicised battlefield in Sudan. There is a discrepancy between theory and practice when it comes 
to women’s issues. In the words of a northern feminist: “They are cheating us. They talk the talk, 
but they do not practise what they preach”.228 It is thus important to encourage and support the 
work of Sudanese women to reform the laws that discriminate against women. The bill of rights in 
the interim national constitution (articles 15 and 32) asserts that “the State shall emancipate women 
from injustice, promote gender equality […] and promoting the equal rights of men and women to 
the enjoyment of all civil and political rights and all social, cultural and economic rights […]”. 
Legal tools to combat discriminatory practices are therefore already in place and are actively being 
used by Sudanese women. Human rights lawyers actively challenge the discriminatory laws 
concerning women on a daily basis.  
4.3 Change from above or from below? 
A legal reform from the top down will have little effect on the general rights situation of ordinary 
women, because “Sudanese society is not a law society.”229 For example, female circumcision is 
prohibited by law, but it is nonetheless a widespread practice. A northern activist says that Sudan 
should ratify CEDAW, simply because “the law does not matter anyway”. 230 It is important to 
remember that the discourse on CEDAW is most likely falling short of meeting the everyday needs 
of a large number of ordinary Sudanese women. Nonetheless, the family laws are at the very heart 
of everyday life of Sudanese women. The debate over CEDAW thus becomes important because it 
promotes a law reform which guarantees all Sudanese women equal civil rights. However, it takes 
more than a law reform to change the patriarchal structure of society. Transformation cannot merely 
be imposed from the top down, but must come from within the society itself. 
 
We suspect that most women at the grass roots are not even aware of the de facto legal rights they 
have within the current legal system. Moreover, they might not view their current rights situation as 
discriminatory. What might seem like a “quick fix” to eliminate discrimination against women 
through a law reform might turn out to be a vain law which has no real effect on the lives of 
ordinary women. At present, an abundance of capacity building workshops and seminars are being 
organised by foreign NGOs targeting mainly elite women, in which the mantras presented by the 
NGOs are “political participation” and “law reform”. But what Sudanese women identify as main 
challenges are education and awareness raising among men and women at the grass roots.  
 
The international community can potentially play an important role by supporting women’s 
organisations and institutions with a local outreach. Otherwise, one might end up with a situation 
where, in the words of a Sudanese activist, “the only thing we do is go to workshops and seminars, 
and talk”.231 Without genuine grass-roots work, the law reforms at the national level will remain 
abstract concepts of women’s rights. Examples of local outreach might be micro-finance projects 
targeting women, legal aid for women and awareness-raising about the negative health risks of 
female circumcision, and human rights training of judges in the local sharia and traditional courts.  
 
                                                     
228 Interview with Samira al-Mahdi (Tønnessen). 
229 Interview with Afaf Ahmed Abdel Rahman 
230 Ibid. 
231 Conversation with Amal Muhammad Al-Mauri, a northern activist and lawyer, at a workshop on training for political 
leadership on 9 November 2006 in Omdurman (Tønnessen). 
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Appendix 1: Glossary of Islamic Legal Terms  
Ahl al-kitab: Literally: People of the Book. This is a classical Islamic legal term, referring to 
Christians, Jews and Sabeans, and later even to Hindus. 
 
Ayb: Defect. 
 
Bayt al-ta’a: Marital obligation of the wife to remain in the husband’s house. 
 
Dhimmi: A dhimmi is a person of the dhimma, a term which in Islamic law refers to a pact 
contracted between non-Muslims and authorities from their Muslim government. This status was 
originally only made available to non-Muslims who were People of the Book, granting them a 
protected status in Muslim society in return for payment of the tax, jizya.  
 
Dia: Blood money, indemnity for bodily injury. 
 
Fatwa: A formal legal opinion on a subject issued by an Islamic scholar. 
 
Fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence. Before the 19th century, legal theory was considered the domain of 
the traditional legal schools of thought. Most Sunni Muslims follow the Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki or 
Shafi'i schools, and most Shi’a Muslims follow the Ja’fari school of law. 
 
Hadana: The care and custody of children, stemming from the Arabic root al-hidn, meaning breast, 
for the first right of custody lies with the mother until the children reach the prescribed ages, when 
custody passes to the father and his kin. Hadin, male custodian. Hadina, female custodian. 
 
Hadiths [sing: hadith; plural: ahadith] are the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, actions and 
preferences. Hadiths are regarded as the second most important source, after the Koran, of the 
legislation of the sharia.  
 
Idda: The period after divorce or the death of the husband, in which a woman must pass three 
monthly courses in order to ensure that she is not pregnant. During the idda period the wife is 
entitled to maintenance, which is referred to as nafaqat al-‘idda. 
 
Ihtiram: Respect. 
 
Ijma’ is an Arabic legal term referring ideally to the consensus of the ummah (the community of 
Muslims, or followers of Islam). Traditionally, ijma’ referred only to the consensus of traditional 
Islamic scholars (ulema’) on particular points of Islamic law.  
 
Ijtihad is a technical term of Islamic law that describes the process of making a legal decision by 
independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Koran and the Sunnah. A person who applies 
ijtihad is called a mujtahid, and traditionally had to be a scholar of Islamic law. However, most of 
today’s Islamists are not religious scholars, but Western educated scholars.  
 
Kafir: Unbeliever. (pluralis: kuffar). 
 
Khafad: Clitoridectomy, or the cutting of the prepuce of the clitoris. From the word found in 
hadiths, khafad, meaning “reduce” or “diminish”. 
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Khalifa is the head of state in a Caliphate, and means “successor” or “representative”. The early 
leaders of the Muslim nation following Muhammad's (570–632) death were called “Khalifat ar-
rasul Allah”, meaning the political successor to the Prophet of God. The first four caliphs were 
Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab, Uthman ibn Affan, and Ali ibn Abi Talib.  
 
Khalqulla: The creation of God. 
 
Mahabba: Love, affection and attachment. 
 
Mahr: Dowry, a bridal gift made by the husband to the wife without which the marriage is not 
lawful or valid according to Islam. 
 
Manshurat: Judicial circulars. 
 
Maslaha: Beneficial or “the best interest”. 
 
Millet is an Ottoman Turkish term for a confessional community in the Ottoman Empire. In the 19th 
century, with the tanzimat reforms, the term started to refer to legally protected religious 
minority groups. The millet system has a long history in the Middle East, and is closely linked to 
Islamic rules on the treatment of non-Muslim minorities (dhimmi). The Ottoman term specifically 
refers to the separate legal courts pertaining to family law under which minorities were allowed to 
rule themselves. People were bound to their millets by their religious affiliations.  
 
Mufti: An Islamic scholar issuing fatwas. 
 
Mujtahid: An Islamic scholar making ijtihads. 
 
Nafaqa: Maintenance, including food, clothing and lodging, primarily the husband’s obligation 
arising from marriage to maintain the wife and dependent children. 
 
Nushuz: Disobedience or recalcitrance, a Koranic term denoting the recalcitrance of the woman 
towards her husband.  
 
Qadi: Judge. 
 
Qiyas: In Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, qiyas is the process of analogical reasoning from a known 
injunction to a new injunction. According to this method, the ruling of the Koran and Sunnah may 
be extended to a new problem provided that the precedent (asl) and the new problem (far’) share the 
same operative or effective cause (illah). The illah is the specific set of circumstances that trigger a 
certain law into action.  
 
Ribh: Interest. 
 
Sharia is the body of Islamic law. There is not a strictly codified uniform set of laws pertaining to 
sharia. There is an unclear distinction between the sharia as the divine will of God and fiqh 
(jurisprudence) as the human endeavour to realise it. God expressed his will in the Revelation (the 
Koran and the Sunnah). When man formulates systematic legal precepts out of the Revelation, he 
uses his own intellect in the process. With the human intellect and the ensuing interpretation of the 
Revelation, the process becomes subject to error. In other words, a Muslim can only follow what is 
considered to be the best human interpretation of the sharia; he can never be certain that it is the 
correct interpretation intended by God in the Revelation. The sharia is thus best understood as a 
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shared opinion of the community based on a literature that is extensive but not necessarily coherent 
or authorised by any single body.  
 
Shura is the Arabic word for “consultation”. Sunni Muslims believe that shura is recommended in 
the Koran and by numerous hadiths. They say that the three last of the first four caliphs, or 
successors to Muhammad, whom they call the Four Rightly-guided Caliphs, were chosen by shura. 
Today, some Muslims claim that all decisions made by and for Muslim societies have to involve the 
process of shura. Some regard the process of shura as being “Islamic democracy”. 
 
Sunnah is mainly used to denote the body of hadiths and the historical material of the companions 
of the Prophet Muhammad. 
 
Sunni schools of law. The four major Sunni schools of law (sing: madhhab, plur: madhahib) are 
named after their respective founders: (1) Hanafi School, founded by Abu Hanifa (d. 767); (2) 
Maliki School, founded by Malik ibn Abbas (d. 795); (3) Shafi'i School, founded by 
Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi`i (d. 820); (4) Hanbali School, founded by Ahmad bin Hanbal (d. 
855).  
 
Ta’a: Obedience. 
 
Tajdid is the Arabic word for renewal. In an Islamic context, tajdid refers to the renewal of Islam 
through reinterpretation of the sacred texts (ijtihad). 
 
Talaq: Divorce, repudiation, which is the unilateral right of the Muslim husband. 
 
Tatliq: Divorce, whereby a judge can dissolve the marriage at the wife’s request. There are certain 
requirements for such a divorce, such as the husband’s sexual impotence, the husband’s physical 
abuse of his wife, or the husband’s absence for a certain number of years. 
 
Thawb: The long material Sudanese Muslim women wrap around their bodies and loosely over the 
head. 
 
Ulema’: The educated class of Muslim scholars engaged in the several fields of Islamic studies. 
They are best known as the arbiters of sharia law. The ulema’ are well versed in jurisprudence.  
 
Ummah is an Arabic word meaning Community or Nation. It is commonly used to mean the 
collective nation of Muslim states or the nation of all Muslims in the world.  
 
Urf: Custom that is recognised by the sharia provided that the customary practice does not conflict 
with any basic tenet of Islam. 
 
Wali: The legal guardian of a woman in marriage, usually her father. 
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Appendix 2: List of Interviewees 
Muslim opposition leaders: 
Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the PNC  
Wisal al-Mahdi, responsible for women’s affairs in the PNC 
Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the UP  
Mohammed Ibrahim Nugud, leader of the SCP  
Ali al-Sayed, leader of the National Democratic Alliance and a Member of Parliament  
Bashir Adam Rahma, political secretary of the PNC  
Samira al-Mahdi, member of the executive bureau of the DUP  
Miriam al-Mahdi, general secretary for communication for the UP  
Yousif Takana, leader of the Umma Federal Party and the former minister of international 
cooperation 
 
Christian church leaders: 
Mark Abeccien, leader of the Sudan Council of Churches  
Fr Antonius Fakious, deputy bishop, Coptic Orthodox Church 
Ismaeil Kanani, dean at the Nile Theological College, Presbyterian 
Sister Margareth, vice chairman of the non-governmental organisation Christians and Muslims for 
Peace (CAMP), active in the main Catholic Church in Khartoum 
Bishop Deng, the Episcopal Church in the South 
Fr. Peter Loro Bambu, secretary general of the Sudan Catholic Bishops’ Conference 
 
Government officials: 
Farida Ibrahim, presidential advisor for women’s affairs 
Haroun Ron Lual, presidential advisor 
Anne Itto, minister (state) of agriculture, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement  
Ahmed Ali al-Imam, advisor to the president on sharia 
Ahmed Khalid BaBakir, leader of the Islamic jurisprudence council 
Abdul Rahim Ali, leader of the shura council of the NCP  
Helen Louise Olear, Christian Member of Parliament for the NCP representing the Southern state 
Eastern Equatoria. Active in various women organisations 
Abdurrahman Ali, head of the shura council of the NCP, Member of the Islamic Jurisprudence 
Council, head of Khartoum International Academy  
Badria Suliman Abbas, chairperson of the Legislation and Justice Committee of the National 
Assembly 
Attiyah Mustapha, Member of Parliament for the NCP 
 
Judges: 
Rababa Abu Ghazayza, judge of the Supreme Court and member of the Islamic jurisprudence 
council (head of the legal group) 
Chief Sultan Hasan Wijel Shatil, Muslim judge in a local traditional court for customary law in 
Khartoum 
Chief Sultan Paul, Christian judge in a local traditional court for customary law in Khartoum 
 
Journalists: 
Alfred Taban, editor of the opposition and southern-based newspaper Khartoum Monitor 
Sabah Muhammad, journalist at the daily newspaper al-ayyam.  
 
 
CMI REPORT DISCRIMINATION IN THE NAME OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM R 2007: 5 
 43 
Researchers: 
Haydar Ibrahim Ali, expert on the Sudanese Islamist movement 
  
Governmental organisations: 
Al-Tayyib Zain Abidin, secretary general of the Sudan Inter-religious Council  
Ihsan Ghabshawi, secretary general of the International Muslim Women’s Union  
 
Non-governmental organisations: 
Rose L. Paulino, chairperson of the Network for Southern Organisation for Peace  
Elham Khayri, member of the Sudan Organisation for Non-Violence and Development  
Afaf Ahmed Abdel Rahman, general manager of Women Center for Peace and Development 
Mudawi Ibrahim Adam, chairperson of the Sudan Social Development Organisation 
Aziza Hassanien, member of the Women Initiative Group 
Amna Abdel Rahman Hassan, executive secretary for the Sudan National Committee on Harmful 
Traditional Practices  
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